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PRODUCTS LIABILITY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RULE 
OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY FOR PRODUCT-RELATED 
INJURIES 
Products liability law is a fast-developing area. All the 
rules have not yet been formulated and products liability 
law, as it matures, has to shake off various impediments 
associated with traditional concepts, which, while relevant 
to other problems, are inappropriate for this new area .1 
The notion that a manufacturer or supplier of goods should be 
strictly liable for injuries resulting from the use of those goods did 
not exist at common law. 2 It has arisen since the tum of the cen-
tury3 as a judicial response to the increasingly sophisticated nature 
of manufactured goods and marketing techniques. 4 Gradually, the 
harsh doctrine of caveat emptor5 has given way to the realization 
1 Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 416, 244 N.W.2d 873, 877 (1976). 
2 Historically, a supplier's responsibility for injury or damage caused by its goods was 
defined in terms of negligence or breach of warranty. In recent years, these doctrines have 
been widely supplanted by the concept of strict liability in tort. Wade, On The Nature of 
Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 825-26 (1973). 
Strict products liability has been distinguishe·d from the classic principle of strict liability 
announced in the seminal case, Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. I Ex. 265 (Exch. Ch. 1866), affd, 
L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). Rylands-type liability is essentially absolute in situations where the 
activity which generated the injury or damage is abnormal or ultrahazardous, while strict 
products liability attaches only where the product is shown to have a "defect" that caused 
the injury. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 
700, 377 P.2d 897, 900 (1963). However, at least one court has stated that the term "strict 
products liability" is not particularly helpful as it may easily be confused with the absolute 
Rylands-type liability. Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 611-12, 182 
N .W.2d 800,807 (1970). That court concluded that "it might be helpful ifwe abandoned the 
continued use in this context of our present and misleading terminology of warranty and 
representation, express and implied, and strict liability in tort, and simply refer to the manu-
facturer's liability by the neutral term 'product liability.' "Id. at 614, 182 N.W. 2d at 807. 
See also Wade, supra at 835-36. 
3 The development of the concept of strict liability is traced in Prosser, The Assault Upon 
The Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Assault]; Prosser, The Fall of the 
Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Prod-
ucts and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965); Wade, The Continuing Development 
of Strict Liability in Tort, 22 ARK. L. REV. 233 (1968); Wade, supra note 2. There are numer-
ous other treatments. 
• Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,467, 150 P.2d 436,443 (1944) (Traynor, 
J. concurring): 
As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great markets and 
transportation facilities, the close relationship between the producer and consumer 
of a product has been altered. Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable sec-
rets, are ordinarily either inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public. 
The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the 
soundness of a product, even when it is not contained in a sealed package, and his 
erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build 
up confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as trade-marks. 
5 
"Let the buyer beware." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 281 (4th ed. 1968). 
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that today's layman has neither the capacity nor the opportunity to 
acquire the expertise necessary to determine the fitness of the 
goods he uses. 6 Thus, a growing number of courts and com-
mentators agree that the consumer needs special protection in the 
market place. 7 This special protection is provided by the evolving 
doctrine of strict products liability under which the seller's respon-
sibility for injuries resulting from the use of its products is continu-
ally expanding.8 
In one area of the law, however, traditional doctrine has, until 
recently, blocked this expansion. Under traditional principles of 
corporate law, when a manufacturer sells its business and dissolves 
before the product-related injury occurs, there may be no viable 
defendant for the injured plaintiff to pursue. 9 Special rules protect 
6 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 384, 161 A.2d 69, 83 (1960). The 
historical development of the rights of the modem consumer through the gradual abrogation 
of the classical doctrine of caveat emptor is discussed in Gillam, Products liability in a Nut-
shell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119 (1958). 
7 Note, Expanding the Products Liability of Successor Corporations, 27 HAST. L.J. 1305, 
1305 (1976). 
8 Strict products liability was initially limited to cases involving adulterated food and 
other products for intimate bodily use, but the trend in recent decisions has been to expand 
the scope of the special rule of liability to all products that may cause harm to the consumer 
or his property. Assault, supra note 3, at 1139-40. The barriers to recovery have also been 
lowered by alterations in the plaintiff's burden of proof. Under the theories of negligence or 
breach of warranty, the injured person must show a contractual relationship with the seller, 
or must show his injury was a foreseeable result of the seller's negligence. Strict liability 
may be imposed on ariy member of the distribution chain without regard to privily, proof of 
reliance upon express or implied representations, or negligence. W. PROSSER, LAW OF 
TORTS § 98 ( 4th ed. 1971). Additionally, courts have manifested their willingness to favor the 
interest of the injured consumer over the manufacturer in the adoption in a majority of juris-
dictions of the negligence statute of limitations for claims brought on the theory of strict 
products liability. Under a breach of warranty theory, the statute oflimitations begins to run 
at the time the product is sold or delivered. Thus, in some cases, the statute might bar a 
claim before the injury actually occurs. Under a negligence theory, the statute does not 
begin to run until the injury occurs. By choosing to allow the injured plaintiff to pursue his 
claim under the more liberal rule at the expense of the manufacturer's interest in repose, the 
courts have clearly indicated their willingness to abandon existing doctrines which are in-
consistent with the .underlying societal policy favoring full recovery to the widest possible 
number of injured consumers. Juenger & Schulman, Assets Sales and Products Liability, 22 
WAYNE L. REV. 39, 39 n.2 (1975). See also Comment, Assumption of Products Liability in 
Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 88 (1975). · 
• In some cases, the injured plaintiff may have a number of potential defendants besides 
the original manufacturer or its successor to pursue. Other members in the chain of distribu-
tion of the defective product such as wholesalers or retailers may be held responsible for the 
plaintiff's injuries. Negligence may be evident, but even if there is no negligence, all dealers 
in goods are liable to their customers for the implied warranties of fitness and merchantable 
quality as a function of the doctrine of strict products liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS§ 402A, comment f (i965). However, many products such as industrial machinery are 
sold by the manufacturer without the benefit of a chain of distribution. In those cases, the 
original manufacturer or its successor may be the only plausible defendants for a products 
liability suit. Comment, supra note 8, at 86. Even there, the injured plaintiff may not be to-
tally barred from recompense. Accidents in work-related settings are typically initially com-
pensated by worker's compensation benefits. See generally Horovitz, Workmen's Compen-
sation: Half Century of Judicial Developments, 41 NEB. L. REV. I (1961). 
Although the concept of strict products liability developed largely in the context of con-
sumer goods, see, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Co., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 
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the interests of known creditors and minority shareholders in the 
event of a corporate dissolution, but these rules make no provision 
for the potential future claim of a products liability plaintiff. 1 0 
Moreover, traditional corporate law shelters the purchasers of an 
ongoing business from liabilities not expressly assumed when the 
697,377 P.2d 897 (1963) (home workshop tool); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 
453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J. concurring) (exploding soda bottle); Spence v. Three 
Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N .W.2d 873 (1958) (cinder 
blocks used in private home); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 
69 (1960) (automobile); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1050 (1916) 
(automobile), there is substantial evidence that the majority of products liability claims in-
volve products in work-related accidents. For example, in the period from September, 1974, 
to August, 1976, of the products liability claims filed in Cook County, ID., courts, 52% of the 
verdicts and 82% of the settlements involved injuries initially covered by worker's compen-
sation. O'Connell, An Immediate Solution to Some Products Liability Problems: Worker's 
Compensation as a Sole Remedy for Employees with an Employer's Remedy Against Third 
Parties, 1976 INS. L.J. 683, 684-85. 
Although employers are frequently responsible for injuries resulting from the use of 
machinery in their plants because they fail to maintain machinery or because they remove 
safety features to improve production speed, worker's compensation schemes preclude em-
ployee suits against their employers. I.A. LARSON, WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION LAW§ 1.10 
(1978). However, the manufacturer of the machinery is not similarly protected. Id. As a re-
sult, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of third party suits against manufac-
turers of capital goods over the past twenty years. This flood of litigation has stimulated a 
concurrent escalation in the cost of products liability insurance. Consequently, some small 
manufacturers have no coverage while others are liquidating rather than risk the chance of a 
debilitating lawsuit. See O'Connell Bargaining for Waivers of Third-Party Tort Claims: 
An Answer to Products Liability Woes for Employers and Their Employees and Suppliers, 
1976 U. ILL. L.F. 435. See also note 42 infra. 
Where there are other members of the distributive chain, the injured plaintiff may success-
fully pursue his remedy against them, but the same problem then arises as to their rights 
against the manufacturer. The law recognizes that any losses incurred by members of the 
distributive chain who function merely as conduits between the manufacturer and the in-
jured consumer should be recouped from the manufacturer. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 464, 150 P.2d 436, 442 (1944) (Traynor, J. concurring). If the original 
manufacturer has since sold the business and dissolved, the wholesaler or retailer may be 
fmced to absorb the loss alone. 
Manufacturing entities may be organized as partnerships, limited partnerships, or sole 
proprietorships as well as corporations. For the sake of clarity, this discussion will focus on 
the problems created by corporate dissolution, although it is evident that the competing 
interests are similar notwithstanding the organizational format of the parties to the transfer 
of the business. 
The personal responsibility of a sole proprietor for injuries resulting from the use of prod-
ucts manufactured by his business would not terminate upon its sale, but would effectively 
end upon the proprietor's death and the settling of his estate. Compensation for a product-
related injury after that time could only come from the purchaser of the business. See Cyrv. 
B. Offen & Co., 560 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying New Hampshire law). The liability of 
the members of a partnership for torts committed in the course of business is joint and sev-
eral. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT§§ 13, 15(a); Annot., 175 A.L.R. 1310, 1316 (1948). Dissol-
ution of the partnership does not, of itself, change the nature of this responsibility. See UN-
IFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 36; 60 AM. JuR. 2d Partnership §208 (1972). Even where the 
business continues under the old firm's name, a new organization comprised of different 
persons will not be accountable for the old firm's debts, absent conduct demonstrating an 
agreement to assume such obligations or proof of fraud. 60 AM. JuR. 2d Partnership § 213 
(1972). Consequently, the problems presented by a post-dissolution product-related injury 
are similar whether the original manufacturer was organized as a partnership or a corpora-
tion. 
10 Juenger & Schulman, supra note 8, at 41. See text accompanying notes 18-24, 64-92 
infm. 
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acquisition takes the form of a purchase of assets for adequate con-
sideration, even though the purchaser continues the business oper-
ation without interruption. 11 
These principles by which an ongoing business may be severed 
from its existing and contingent liabilities encourage the free 
alienability of business capital. Specifically, they allow a prospec-
tive purchaser of a business to control the risk of unknown 
liabilities associated with the operation and to determine accu-
rately the appropriate purchase price. 12 Although the control of 
contingent liabilities assumed as a result of an acquisition is clearly 
an important part of responsible business planning, the concurrent 
ability to cut off future products liability claims through the techni-
cal form of the acquisition is contrary to the basic assumptions em-
bodied in the doctrine of strict products liability .13 Manifestly, the 
existing principles of corporate law should be modified to take ac-
count of the special needs of the products liability plaintiff. That 
evolutionary process has already begun, 14 but it is evident that the 
judiciary has experienced some difficulty in striking a workable 
balance between the interests of the injured consumer and the bus-
iness community. 
This article will briefly review the traditional principles of corpo-
rate law governing the assumption of liabilities in the acquisition of 
an ongoing business, and the doctrinal premises of strict products 
liability. Attention will then be critically directed to recent de-
velopments in case law in which the traditional rules have been 
modified to reflect the policy considerations of strict products lia-
bility. Finally, this article will discuss the possibility of legislative 
intervention in the development of new principles governing suc-
cessor responsibility for products liability claims and propose that 
this problem is an appropriate subject for legislative rather than 
judicial action. 
11 See, e.g., Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977); Leannais v. Cincinnati, 
Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Lopata v. Bemis Co., 383 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974); 
National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Borden Co., 363 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Bazan v. Kux 
Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 
817 (D. Colo. 1968); Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 
(1975); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555,264 A.2d 98 (L. Div. 1970), affd 
per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972). Cf. Shannon v. Samuel 
Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (express assumption of liability require-
ment avoided by finding of a de facto merger~. 
12 Comment, supra note 8, at 91. 
13 See text accompanying notes 105-13 infra. 
14 See Parts III and IV infra. 
342 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 12:2 
I. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO POST-DISSOLUTION LIABILITY 
A. Post-Dissolution Liability of a Corporation and Its Stockholders 
Although a corporation is physically composed of a number of 
individuals (officers, shareholders, and employees) in almost all 
its dealings, it is characterized by the _law as having an identity of 
its own, completely separate from that of its various members. 15 
Thus, contractual obligations are created in the name of the cor-
poration, and claims arising as a result of corporate activities are 
generally pursued in the name of the corporation. 16 Given this con-
ceptual separation between the corporation and its members, it is 
not surprising that, at common law, corporate dissolution was 
analogized to the death of an individual and,just as death ended all 
suits against that individual, dissolution was said to abate all claims 
against the corporation.17 
1. Trust Fund - Whatever the merit of the reasoning underlying 
this analogy, the practical effect was to allow a corporation to 
avoid its creditors by selling its assets, voluntarily dissolving, and 
distributing the sale proceeds to its stockholders. To prevent this 
abuse, the courts of the time devised an equitable remedy under 
which a defunct corporation's creditors could pursue the assets of 
the entity into the hands of its stockholders. 18 In effect, the stock-
holders were said to hold the assets as a' 'trust fund" for the ben-
efit of the corporation's unpaid creditors. 1 9 
This equitable theory provided substantial relief for unsatisfied 
creditors prejudiced by corporate dissolution, but it was not the op-
timal solution to the problem. The relatively long statute of limita-
tions associated with equitable claims20 meant that the sharehol-
15 I w. FLETCHER. PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 25 (rev. ed. 1974) For an extensive intro-
duction to the philosophic concept of the corporate form of organization, see id.§§ 24-48 
16 /d.at99. 
17 Henn & Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution on Products Liability Claims, 56 
CORNELL L. REV. 865, 879-80 (1971). 
Dissolution is the termination of the legal existence of the corporation. It should be di stin-
guished from liquidation or winding up, which involves collecting the assets, paying cred-
itors, and distributing the excess to shareholders in accordance with their respective inter-
ests. N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS§ 175 (2d ed. 1971). 
18 Wallach, Products Liability: A Remedy in Search of a Defendant - The Effect of a Sale 
of Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on Product Dissatisfaction Claims, 41 Mo. L. REV. 
321, 328 (1976). 
1
• Under this theory, unsatisfied creditors could assert their claims directly against the 
shareholders 9f the dissolved corporation. Some claims against officers or directors of the 
corporation for misappropriation of funds or improper management may not be abated by 
corporate dissolution and so are not affected by the "trust fund" doctrine. See note 23 infra. 
The parameters of the "trust fund" doctrine are described in detail in Updike v. United 
States, 8 F.2d 913, 917-18 (8th Cir. 1925). 
20 Typically the statute of limitations on equitable claims is IO years. Wallach, supra note 
18, at 330 n.34. 
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ders of a dissolving corporation would be subjected to a prolonged 
period of uncertainty as to potential claims. Moreover, creditors 
who sought recompense were forced to pursue each stockholder 
individuallyfor his proportionate share of the debt.21 
2. Abatement Statutes -Today, virtually every state has stat-
utory provisions controlling the institution of claims against a dis-
solved corporation. 22 These provisions delay for a specified period 
of time the abatement of claims that otherwise occurs upon dissolu-
tion.23 In essence, the corporation continues to exist for a time sol-
ely for the purpose of litigation. To assure that sufficient funds will 
exist to satisfy the claims made during this period, state corpora-
tion statutes impose a duty on the corporate officers to withhold 
sufficient funds from the distribution following dissolution to 
satisfy known corporate obligations which are subject to dispute or 
which are not yet mature. 24 
21 See Updike v. United States, 8 F.2d 913, 918 (8th Cir. 1925). 
22 16 W. FLETCHER, supra note 15, at § 8143. 
23 The postponement of abatement statutes are designed to operate in lieu of the applica-
ble statute of limitations. They require the commencement of the suit within the specific 
period whether the statute of limitations for the claim has begun to run or not. The length of 
time following dissolution within which claims must be brought by or against the dissolved 
corporation varies from state to state. Most schemes provide a two or three year period. 
Wallach, supra note 18, at 325. 
The ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 105 (rev. ed. 1976) provides in pertinent part: 
§ 105 Survival of Remedy After Dissolution.-The dissolution of a corporation ... 
shall not take away or impair any remedy available to or against such corporation, 
its directors, officers, or shareholders, for any right or claim existing, or any liabil-
ity incurred prior to such dissolution if action or other proceeding thereon is com-
menced within two years after the date of such dissolution. 
Citations to individual state statutes are collected in MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. 2D 
§ 106, ,I 6 A.B.A. (1971) [hereinafter cited as M.B.C.A. ANN.]. 
24 See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 87 (rev. ed. 1976): 
§ 87 Procedure After Filing of Statement of Intent to Dissolve.-After the filing 
(a) The corporation shall immediately cause notice thereof to be mailed to each 
known creditor of the corporation. 
(b) The corporation shall proceed to collect its assets, convey and dispose of 
such of its properties as are not to be distributed in kind to its shareholders, pay, 
satisfy and discharge its liabilities and obligations and do all other acts required to 
liquidate its business and affairs, and after paying or adequately providing for the 
payment of all its obligations, distribute the remainder of its assets ... among its 
shareholders according to these respective rights and interests. 
Individual state statutes are cited in M.B.C.A. ANN. §§ 85-87, ,i 6. 
If the corporate officer fails to so provide for outstanding obligations, Section 48 of the 
Model Act specifies that a dissatisfied creditor may seek his remedy against the officers and 
directors individually. 
§ 48 Liability of Directors in Certain Cases. 
• • • 
(c) A director who votes or assents to any distribution of assets of a corporation 
to its shareholders during the liquidation of the corporation without the payment 
and discharge of, or making adequate provision for, all known debts, obligations, 
and liabilities of the corporation shall be liable to the corporation, jointly and sev-
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For both creditors and stockholders, this statutory pattern rep-
resents a significant improvement over the previous equitable re-
medy. It permits the creditor to file against one entity rather than a 
number of widely dispersed stockholders and it provides corporate 
officers and stockholders with a measure of repose, for claims 
made against the corporation must be filed within the statutory 
period or they are waived. 25 Even so, it is unlikely that the post-
ponement of abatement statutes would provide a viable remedy for 
an injured consumer whose claim arises after dissolution is com-
plete. In general, the statutes focus on the preservation of claims 
for corporate liabilities incurred prior to dissolution.26 
Arguably, even though the postponement of abatement statutes 
and the "trus t fund" theory serve the same general function, the 
postponement of abatement statutes were not designed to provide 
a remedy for claims arising after dissolution and therefore the 
"trust fund" theory should be retained to insure a remedy for such 
claims. Legislative intent is generally unclear. The comments to 
erally with all other directors so voting or assenting, for the value of such assets 
which are distributed, to the extent that such debts, obligations and liabilities of the 
corporation are not thereafter paid and discharged. 
Citations to individual state statutes are collected in M.B.C.A. ANN. § 48, ,r 6. 
25Under ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT §§ 100, 105 (rev. ed. 1976), claims which ac-
crue prior to the decree of dissolution must be filed during the specified post-dissolution 
grace period or be barred. However, claims arising from the failure of an officer or director 
to comply with statutory dissolution procedures do not normally abate upon corporate dis-
solution and therefore are not barred by the expiration of the post-dissolution grace period. 
Henn & Alexander, supra note 16, at 885 n.110. 
There are numerous va·riations of this basic pattern in state corporate statutes. For a de-
tailed treatment of the effect of dissolution on subsequent products liability claims, see Henn 
& Alexander, supra note 16. 
26 The language of the particular statute may suggest that post-dissolution claims arising 
within the grace period may also be pursued. Under statutes patterned after ABA-ALI 
MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 105 (rev. ed. 1976), only those claims that are known as of the 
date of dissolution will survive to be pursued during the statutory grace period. See Chad-
wick v. Air Reduction Co., 239'F. Supp. 247, 250-51 (N .D. Ohio 1965) (refers to§ 98, which 
was renumbered as § 105 in 1969). 
A products liability claim may be said to arise at different times depending upon the theory 
under which it is pursued. Products liability claims inay be brought on the theories of negli-
gence, breach of warranty, or strict liability. In many jurisdictions all three theories are 
available, but at least two are available in most states. Wade, supra note 2, at 849. Under the 
theories of negligence or strict liability, the claim will not arise until the injury is, or should 
have been, discovered. Comment, Statutes of Limitations: Their Selection and Application 
in Products Liability Cases, 23 V AND. L. REV. 775, 781, 787 (1970). 
Under the theory of breach of warranty as codified in the Uniform Commercial Code, the 
cause of action accrues when "tender of delivery is made." U.C.C. 2-725(2). Therefore, in 
states that have adopted postponement of abatement statutes similar to the ABA-ALI Model 
Act, a claim arising from a post-dissolution injury brought on the theories of negligence or 
strict liability might be barred, while the same claim brought on the theory of breach of war-
ranty might not. Wallach, supra note 18, at 326-27. Even so, unless the injury predates dis-
solution, the officers of the corporation will not have notice of the potential claim, and they 
are not expected to withhold funds from distribution unless the claim is known. See, e.g., 
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 87 (rev. ed. 1976) and note 21 supra. As a practical 
matter, therefore, the claim may be pursued but there will be no assets withheld from dis-
tribution to satisfy it. 
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section 105 of the Model Business Corporations Act suggest that 
the "trust fund" theory is unnecessary where a postponement of 
abatement provision has been adopted,27 and the Wisconsin legis-
lature modified its postponement of abatement provision to make it 
clear that the statutory remedy is exclusive. 28 Logically, if the 
"trust fund" theory remains a viable remedy, the comparatively 
long statute of limitations which accompanies such equitable re-
medies29 would frustrate the policy of repose inherent in the stat-
utory scheme.30 As a general proposition, equitable remedies are 
thought to operate where no legal remedy exists or where it is 
shown to be inadequate. 3 1 The "trus t fund" theory arose to pro-
vide unsatisfied creditors with a remedy despite the operation of 
the common law rule of abatement. The statutes now arguably 
provide an adequate legal remedy for those creditors. The clear 
public policy favoring the satisfaction of products liability claims,32 
however, suggests the retention of the equitable remedy where an 
injured consumer is concerned, since he may have no other defen-
dant to pursue. 
Evidently, the most that can be said is that the law is uncertain.33 
While the postponement of abatement statutes provide a reliable 
pattern for the disposition of claims against the dissolved corpora-
tion, the potential existence of the equitable "trust fund" remedy 
against the former shareholders of the corporation may provide the 
injured consumer with his only opportunity to recover. Even so, in 
pragmatic terms the remedy afforded by the "trust fund" theory is 
less than ideal. Each shareholder must be located and joined in the 
suit and each may be held responsible only for his proportionate 
share of the judgment. The technical problems inherent in the pur-
suit of such a claim may therefore render this remedy impractical in 
the context of a products liability claim.34 
27 M.B.C.A. ANN. § 105, ,r 2. 
28 Young, Some Comments on the New Wisconsin Business Corporation Law, 1952 Wts. 
L. REV. 5, 14-15. 
29 See note 20 supra. 
30 Wallach, supra note 18, at 333. Professor Wallach discusses the relationship between 
the "trust fund" theory and modem postponement of abatement statutes in detail and con-
cludes that, absent more convincing evidence of legislative intent to abrogate the equitable 
remedy, courts may prove willing to allow a products liability plaintiff to pursue the 
shareholders of a dissolved corporation under the "trust fund" theory. Id. at 334-35. 
31 D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES§ 2.5 (1973). 
32 W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 641-43. 
33 Wallach, supra note 18, at 334. 
34 Unless the stockholder happens to be a large, affluent corporation, the remedy afforded 
by the "trust fund" theory is decidedly less attractive than a remedy against an easily iden-
tified and located, viable, solvent entity such as the transferee. Juenger & Schulman, supra 
note 8, at 44. 
The problems confronting the products liability plaintiff seeking recompense from a dis-
solved corporation, its officers, or its shareholders are discussed in Henn & Alexander, 
supra note 17. 
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B. Claims Against the Successor to the Original Manufacturer 
I. Methods of Transfer and Successor Liability - When a cor-
poration dissolves, the assets may be distributed directly to the 
shareholders. However, it is more common for the assets to be sold 
to a third party and the consideration then distributed to the 
shareholders. The assets may be sold piecemeal, but it is generally 
acknowledged that, in the vast majority of cases, a going business 
is more valuable than the sum of its parts.35 Thus, it is not surpris-
ing that businesses commonly change hands without substantial in-
terruption in business operations or outward appearance.36 Despite 
this semblance of continuity, each corporation is a distinct legal 
personality and the law does not generally compel the purchaser of 
a business to assume the liabilities incurred by the former owner of 
that business. 37 In fact, the assumption of liabilities in corporate 
acquisitions depends upon the method of acquisition and the terms 
of the specified agreement between the contracting parties. 38 There 
are several well-established techniques by which control of an on-
going enterprise may be transferred: (1) statutory merger or con-
solidation; (2) purchase of the stock of the target corporation; and 
35 See generally I A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 281-95 (5th ed. 
1953). A going concern may be said to be comprised of three distinguishable elements: per-
manent property, current capital, and the intangible elements that distinguish the ongoing 
enterprise from the dead business-"organization". Id. at 282. Pragmatically, the value of a 
business as a going concern must be measured in terms of its ability to generate income, for 
the "actual value of any commodity ... is bottomed on what a property will produce in 
earnings to the owner." Temmer v. Denver Tramway Co., 18 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1927), 
quoted in I A. DEWING, supra at 287 note n. This assessment, commonly known as 
"capitalization of net earnings," consists of two steps: (I) a determination of the fundamen-
tal earning capacity of the ongoing business; and (2) an assessment of the relative probability 
that this rate d earning will continue. The greater the risks associated with the operation, 
the greater the doubt of continued earnings and therefore, the lower the value of the enter-
prise to a prospective purchaser. Id. at 288. 
36 The rationale underlying this phenomenon was convincingly presented in the defen-
dant- appellee's brief quoted at length by the court in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 
397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). 
Obviously, Harris is a well-known corporation on the New Yolk Stock Exchange 
and has been a well-known corporation for years. It would make no business sense 
for Hanis to change its name. Obviously the only prudent business decision was 
for Hanis to form a new corporation which could inherit the name of the selling 
corporation, and thus, hopefully, continue on with the goodwill which the selling 
corporation had established with the public over a period of approximately sixty 
years. There is nothing unusual or fraudulent in Harris setting up a corporation to 
inherit the name of a corporation which Hanis paid a huge sum of cash to, where 
part of the assets purchased were the goodwill and name of the selling corporation 
.... If goodwiU is to be indeed acquired, it certainly will not occur if the purchaser 
operates its business under a new name, foreign to the public. Obviously, there 
must be continuity in the eyes of the public. 
Id. at 416, 244 N .W.2d at 877. See also Note, Rights of Creditors Against a Successor Cor-
poration, 44 HARV. L. REV. 260, 260 (1930). 
37 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 15, at§ 7122. See discussion of this principle in the text 
accompanying notes 59-79 infra. 
38 Comment, supra note 8, at 91. 
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(3) purchase of the assets of the target corporation.39 There are a 
number of factors which must be considered in the choice of an ac-
quisition technique,40 but it is clear that the ability to sever a busi-
ness from its existing and contingent obligations may well be a con-
trolling factor in some acquisition negotiations.41 
Merger and consolidation are effected by compliance with the 
applicable state corporation statutes.42 Generally, compliance with 
39 D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 679-80 (1966). 
40 A number of the tax and non tax considerations which may affect the choice of acquisi-
tion mode are discussed in Darrell, The Use of Reorganization Techniques in Corporate Ac-
quisitions, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1183 (1957). The influence of federal securities laws in the area 
of corporate acquisitions is a topic of vast complexity, beyond the scope of this discussion. 
For an introduction to this question, the reader is referred to Lockwood, Corporate Acquisi-
tions and Actions Under Sections lO(b) and 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 
Bus. LAW. 365 (1%8). 
41 Darrell, supra note 41, at 1201--02; Wallach, supra note 18, at 336 n.55; Comment, supra 
note 8, at 91. 
It is probable that fear of unknown contingent products liability claims was not a major 
factor in selection of the mode of corporate acquisition in years past. More recently, 
thousands of manufacturing companies have been significantly affected by the dramatic in-
crease in products liability claims and concurrent escalation in products liability insurance 
premiums. See generally Legal Affairs: The Devils in the Product Liability Laws, Bus. 
WEEK, FEB., 12, 1979, at 72. For example, products liability insurance premiums for one 
small machine manufacturer increased from $2,000 in 1970 to $200,000 in 1976. Another 
small manufacturer of product-handling equipment reported that its products liability insur-
ance premium went from $4,000 to $100,000 in one twelve month period. These cases are 
extreme examples, but it is certain that the increasing cost of products liability litigation is 
having a serious detrimental effect on the profitability of manufacturing drugs, aircraft, 
tools, industrial safety devices and all forms of capital goods. Some companies have opted to 
continue production without any insurance; some have terminated particular product lines; 
a few have decided to liquidate. Wysock, Litigation Load Manufacturers Are Hit With More 
Lawsuits, Rising Insurance Costs, Wall St. J., June 3, 1976, at I, col. -. See also Product 
Liability Insurance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation on § 403, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-53 (1977) (statement 
of Victor E. Schwartz). 
If this trend of soaring insurance costs continues, many more small manufacturers will 
likely be forced to sell out. Furthermore, as corporate transfers stimulated by products lia-
bility costs increase, the existing principles of law concerning the continuing liability of suc-
cessors and original manufacturers will be a growing source of difficulty for products liabil-
ity plaintiffs. 
42 Every state provides a formal procedure by which a statutory merger or consolidation 
may be effected. E.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §§ 71-81 (rev. ed. 1976). Citations 
to individual state statutes are collected in M.B.C.A. ANN.§ 71-72 ,r 6. 
The term "merger" is commonly used to describe all sorts of corporate combinations. 
Technically, however, corporate combinations may take three distinct forms. 15 W. 
FLETCHER, supra note 15, at § 7075. A merger occurs when one corporation absorbs 
another. The shareholders of the disappearing corporation receive shares in the surviving 
e·ntity in exchange for their outstanding shares. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. 
AcT § 71 (rev. ed. 1976). A consolidation is effected when the component corporations dis-
solve and an entirely new corporation is specially organized to receive their assets. The 
shareholders of the dissolving corporations trade their shares for shares in the new corpora-
tion. See, e.g., id. § 72. In the third form of corporate combination, the corporations 
coalesce, but retain their separate corporate identities, e.g., where one corporation pur-
chases or leases the property of another, or obtains a controlling block of its stock. 15 W. 
FLETCHER, supra note 15, at § 7075. 
For the purposes of this discussion, it is unnecessary to distinguish between acquisitions 
that take the form of a merger and those that are categorized as consolidations: in both 
transactions, only one corporate entity survives. Therefore, for simplicity, further refer-
ences wiD be to mergers only although it may be assumed that the discussion would apply as 
well to acquisitions labeled "consolidations." 
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the statutory provisions has the advantage of being a tax-free reor-
ganization for federal tax purposes.43 State statutes, however, cus-
tomarily require formal approval of the plan by the shareholders of 
all constituent companies. 44 Usually, a two-thirds majority vote of 
the shares is required for approval and many statutes also require a 
class vote of shares whose rights will be affected by the structural 
change.45 Dissenting shareholders are generally given the right to 
demand that their shares be redeemed for their appraised cash 
value.46 Since, by law, the completion of the statutory procedure 
for merger or consolidation results in the termination of the sepa-
rate legal existences of the constitutent corporations except the 
surviving or new corporation,47 that entity is forced to succeed to 
all the liabilities, including product liabilities, of its predecessors. 48 
Control of an ongoing enterprise may, however, be acquired just 
as effectively without forcing the dissolution of either corporate en-
tity. The acquiring corporation may gain control by purchasing all, 
or a controlling percentage, of the stock of the target corporation. 
The purchase may be made from a few controlling shareholders or 
the public at large; it may be an offer to exchange securities for se-
43 l.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(A). The specific problems associated with qualifying for tax-free 
treatment are beyond the scope of this article. The reader is referred to B. BtTTKER & J. 
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS & SHAREHOLDERS C. 14 ,J 14.12 
(3d. ed. 1971), for a discussion of the "Type-A" tax-free reorgan-ization. 
44 Darrell, supra note 41, at 1192-93. Formal approval can entail considerable expense if 
proxy-solicitation materials must be filed to comply with applicable rules issued by the SEC, 
the state, and any stock exchange on which the stock is listed. Id. at 1188-92. Moreover, 
shareholders may attack the plan under Section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 
U .S.C. § 78j(b)(l976), and SEC Rule IOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-5 (1975). 14 W. FLETCHER, 
supra note 15, at § 7162.1; 89 HARV. L. REV. 1917 (1976). 
45 E.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 73 (rev. ed. 1976), requires the approval ofa 
majority of the shareholders entitled to vote, and provides that any class of shares will be 
entitled to vote on the proposal if the plan affects the rights associated with those shares. 
Individual state statute citations are collected in M.B.C.A. ANN. § 73 ,I 6. 
46 E.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT §§ 80-81 (rev. ed. 1976). State statutory provi-
sions are collected in M.B.C.A. ANN§ 73 ,I 6. Obviously, the appraisal right of dissenting 
shareholders can be used as a poweiful weapon to prevent an otherwise legitimate merger. 
The corporations must be prepared to struggle with the problem of valuation, and must be 
certain that sufficient liquid assets exist to satisfy any dissident claim. This seems particu-
larly burdensome in some situations where the stock of the corporations is publicly mar-
keted, for a dissenter could reach the same result simply by selling his shares. The rule is 
equally difficult fm: the dissenting shareholder. The statutory procedure for obtaining ap-
praisal is complex and could be expensive to the shareholder if he decides to litigate the 
issue of the fair value of his shares. An elaboration on these issues including several views as 
to the future utility of the shareholder's appraisal right is presented in A. CONARD, R. 
KNAUSS, & s. SIEGEL, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 1139-49 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited 
as A. CONARD]. 
47 E.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Co RP. ACT§ 76(b) (rev. ed. 1976). Individual state provi-
sions are collected in M.B.C.A. ANN. § 76 ,I 6. 
48 E.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT § 76(c) (rev. ed. 1976). Individual state sta-
tutes are cited in M.B.C.A. ANN. § 76 ,I 6. All jurisdictions impose the obligations of the 
component corporations upon the surviving or new corporation and expressly provide that 
creditors rights shall not be impaired by the mutation in organizational form. Id. § 3.03(6). 
The liabilities assumed by the surviving entity in a merger include responsibility for the torts 
of the dissolved constituents. 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 15, at § 7121. 
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curities, or an offer to buy for cash. 49 Whatever the configuration, 
both corporate entitites will exist after the acquisition is complete. 
A stock-for-stock purchase may have the advantage of characteri-
zation as a tax-free reorganization for federal tax purposes. 50 It can 
be simpler and less costly than statutory merger because it does not 
generally require formal shareholder approval, or provide for dis-
senter's appraisal rights. 51 The technique is disadvantaged by the 
expensive and time-consuming disclosure procedure which may be 
required by federal securities law when the offer is made to the 
public at large. 52 However, since the corporate identity of the 
target entity continues after the transfer of control is complete, it 
remains primarily responsible for its existing and contingent 
liabilities. 53 
Finally, transfer of control may be achieved through a purchase 
of substantially all of the target business' assets. Compensation 
may be stock in the acquisitor corporation or cash. The transfer can 
be structured to gain tax-free status for federal tax purposes. 54 The 
procedure may, additionally, be much simpler than a statutory 
merger or stock purchase since the procedural formalities are 
avoided. 55 Under most state corporation statutes, only a majority 
of the shareholders of the target co_mpany need approve, and only 
disse_nting shareholders of the target company are provided with 
appraisal rights .56 Moreover, the purchaser may choose, as a mat-
49 Public bids, commonly known as "tender offers," are generally offers to purchase 
shares for cash, but they occasionally are framed as a stock for stock exchange. See Piper v. 
Chris-Craft Ind., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). The cash tender offer has become a favored method 
of acquiring control of publicly held corporations. Not coincidentally, it has also been the 
subject of increased federal regulation. The effect of federal securities law on stock acquisi-
tions is beyond the scope of this discussion. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 
2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CooE Co NG. & Ao. NEWS 2811; Lockwood, supra note 41; 
Note, The Courts and The Williams Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 991 
(1973); Note, Regulation of Tender Offers, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 911. 
50 I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(B). See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 44, at 1/ 14.13, for a 
detailed treatment of the tax aspects of a "Type-B" reorganization. 
5 
• Acquisitor shareholder approval may be necessary if additional shares must be issued 
in the exchange. Darrell, supra note 41, at 1194. 
52 See note 49 supra. 
53 As a stockholder in the target corporation, the acquiring entity assumes the danger of 
future liability to the extent of the vatue of interest it has acquired, but the target corporation 
retains initial legal responsibility for its existing and future liabilities. Note, supra note 7, at 
1308 n.20. 
54 I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(C). See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 44, at 1/ 14.14, for a 
detailed treatment of the tax.free "Type-C" reorganization. 
55 E.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT§ 74 (rev. ed. 1976), provides that the details 
of the plan for merger as embodied in the articles of merger approved by a majority of the 
shareholders, must be delivered to and approved by the state before the plan can become 
effective. Individual variations cf this provision in state corporation laws are collected in 
M.B.C.A. ANN. § 74 11 6. 
The sale of assets technique also may avoid some of the complexities associated with the 
federal securities laws which plague the merger and stock acquisition techniques. See 
Lockwood, supra note 41, at 372-75. 
56 E.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§§ 79-81 (rev. ed. 1976). Individual state sta-
tutes are collected in M.B.C.A. §§ 78,79 11 6, § 8011 6, and § 8111 6. Delaware corporate 
law does not provide appraisal rights either to shareholders of the transferor or transferee in 
a sale of assets. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit .. 8, § 262 (Cum. Supp. 1978); Folk, DeFacto Mer-· 
gers in Delaware: Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 49 VA. L. REV. 126i, 1268 n.31 (1963). 
350 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 12:2 
ter of expediency, to assume only those obligations and liabilities 
integral to the continuation of business operations. Because a sale 
of assets does not, of itself, necessitate the dissolution of the trans-
feror entity, it is presumed to survive the transfer of control and 
remains primarily responsible for liabilities not expressly assumed 
by the purchaser in the agreement. 57 Thus, under the accepted 
rule, a bona fide purchaser of corporate assets for adequate con-
sideration may not be held accountable for liabilities associated 
with those assets not expressly or impliedly assumed.58 
2. Judicially Created Exceptions to the General Rule of Nonas-
sumption -Although this general rule of nonassumption allows an 
ongoing business to be separated from its existing and contingent 
liabilities, it provides ample protection for the claims of the trans-
feror's creditors. If the transferor is not dissolved as a function of 
the sale, and if adequate consideration is paid to the corporation for 
its assets, existing creditors should not be prejudiced .59 In certain 
instances, however, the rights of the target company's creditors 
could be severely compromised by the operation of the general rule 
of nonassumption. For example, in transfers where the considera-
tion cons is ts of stock in the acquiror which has no recognized mar-
ket, the value of the consideration may well be "adequate," but 
the transferor will have no liquid assets with which to satisfy its 
obligations. 60 Or, if the purchaser pays stock consideration directly 
to the target corporation's shareholders instead of to the corporate 
entity, the value paid may be "adequate," but the transferor will 
be unable to pay its debts. 61 Accordingly, the scope of the general 
57 The dissolution of the transferor corporation is not an integral part of a sale of assets, 
but in practice the acquisition of substantially all the assets of a corporation contemplates 
the voluntary dissolution of the seller as soon as is practicable after the transfer is complete. 
Note, supra note 7, at 1309. See, e.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 
1977); Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 
U.S. 965 (1975); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974); 
Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 
288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22,560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 
574 (1977); Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N. W.2d 873 (1976). 
58 This rule has apparently enjoyed universal application since the tum of the century. 
Wallach, supra note 18, at 336. Although the transaction results in a transfer of control of an 
entire business operation, it is essentially a purchase only of property. The rule protecting a 
bona fide purchaser of property from unknown or unassumed claims against that property 
has been thought to be essential to the free alienability of property interests. Comment, 
supra note 8, at 93. Cases expounding this principle are collected in 15 W. FLETCHER, supra 
note 15, § 7122 n.1. 
59 Even if the transferor dissolves soon after the transfer, creditors rights are protected by 
the postponement of abatement statute. See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra. 
60 Some courts have held that a purchase of corporate assets for stock consideration 
would not provide the purchaser with the protection of the general rule of nonassumption. 
See, e.g., Peter v. American Ry. Express Co., 256 S.W. 100 (Kan. City Ct. App. 1923); 
American Ry. Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 636,228 S.W. 433 (1920), afj'd, 273 
U.S. 269 (1927); Comment, Transferee Liability and the C Reorganization, 40 U. COLO. L. 
REv. 380, 395 (1968). But there is also authority for the proposition that securities are 
"adequate" consideration if they are readily marketable. See, e.g., Ozan Lumber Co. v. 
Davis Sewing Mach. Co., 284 F. 161, 172-73 (D. Del. 1922), afj'd, 292 F. 135 (3d Cir. 1932); 
Juenger & Schulman, supra·note 8, at 45-46 n.28. 
61 See, e.g., Luedecke v. Des Moines Cabinet Co., 140 Iowa 223, 118 N.W. 456 (1908). 
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rule is limited by four judicially-created exceptions.62 The acquiror 
of an ongoing enterprise may be held responsible by law for 
liabilities associated with that enterprise, even though the transfer 
of control took the form of a purchase of assets where: (1) the pur-
chase agreement is interpreted to expressly or impliedly assume 
those liabilities; (2) the transaction amounts to a fraudulent attempt 
to escape liability; (3) the purchase amounts to a de facto merger; 
(4) the purchaser is essentially a continuation of the seller. 
It is evident that the express or implied assumption of liabilities 
associated with an ongoing enterprise in the purchase agreement 
will negate the effect of the general rule of nonassumption. Typi-
cally, the acquisition of an operating business includes the acquisi-
tion of certain expressly assumed liabilities. 63 But the law may 
imply a stipulation on the part of the acquiring firm to assume the 
obligations of its predecessor merely by virtue of its acquisition 
and continued operation. 64 
Where the transfer of control may be characterized as somehow 
improper, the creditors of the transferor corporation may pursue 
the assets into the hands of the transferee under the exception for 
fraudulent transfer.65 Most frequently, transfers for inadequate 
consideration are set aside as fraudulent. 66 A transfer may also be 
characterized as fraudulent where the consideration is paid directly 
to the target company's shareholders rather than to the corpora-
tion,67 or where there is evidence that the transferee knew the 
transferor intended to default on its debts. 68 
62 Cases stating the general rule of nonassumption and its four exceptions are collected in 
15 w. FLETCHER, supra note 15, § 7122 n.l. 
63 Note, supra note 7, at 1311. 
64 See, e.g., Bouton v. Litton Indus. Co., 423 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1970); Pearce v. Schneider, 
242 Mich. 28, 217 N.W. 761 (1928). See also Note, supra note 37, at 261. An acquisitor may 
avoid this implied assumption of liabilities by expressly denying responsibility for all 
liabilities not specifically assumed in the purchase agreement. 
65 The various improprieties that have been characterized by courts as fraudulent trans-
fers are discussed in Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 881, 884-899 (1973). 
66 See, e.g., Economy Refining & Serv. Co. v. Royal Nat'l Bank, 20 Cal. App. 3d 434, 97 
Cal. Rptr. 706 (1971); Jackson v. Diamond T. Trucking Co., 100 N.J. Super. 186, 241 A.2d 
471 (L. Div. 1968); Annot., supra note 65, at 890-98. 
67 See, e.g., Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 85 Nev. 276, 454 P.2d 24 (1969); Annot., supra note 
65, at 895-98. 
68 See, e.g., City of Altoona v. Richardson Gas &Oil Co., 81 Kan. 717, 106 P. 1025 (1910). 
See generally 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES§ 324(rev. ed. 
1940); Annot., supra note 65, at 884-887. 
The transferor's creditors may also be provided a remedy against the transferee by the 
applicable bulk sales law. See, e.g., U .C.C. art. 6. Bulk sales laws typically impose respon-
sibility for the liabilities of the transferor associated with the assets on the transferee unless 
notice of the impending sale is provided to all known creditors in advance and unless infor-
·mation about the details of the sale is provided those creditors. See, e.g., U .C.C. §§ 6-104, 
-105, -107. The term "creditors" includes all known claimants against the transferor even 
though the amount or validity of the claim has not been determined as of the date of sale. 
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 6-104(2). Additionally, Article 6 imposes an affirmative duty on the 
transferee to oversee the payment of the transferor's outstanding obligations but not every 
state has enacted such a provision U.C.C. § 6-106. For a thorough discussion of the theory 
and operation of bulk transfer laws, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE 640-66 (1972). 
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The equitable doctrine of de facto merger arose because control 
of an ongoing enterprise may be attained by a purchase of assets 
without the protection to dissenting shareholders and creditors af-
forded by law in a statutory merger.69 The ultimate objective of a 
transfer may be the merger of the enterprises into one surviving en-
tity, but if the transfer takes the form of a purchase of assets, in 
most states only a majority of the shareholders of the target com-
pany need approve, no dissenting shareholder has appraisal rights, 
and the surviving entity need not assume any of the liabilities of the 
dissolving corporation although the business continues without in-
terruption. 7° Creditors and dissenting shareholders therefore per-
suaded courts to treat such transactions as tantamount to statutory 
mergers, forcing the parties to comply with the statutory for-
malities. 71 
To determine whether the transaction has the earmarks of a 
merger, courts have examined the nature of the transaction as a 
whole and its consequences. 72 In statutory merger, the component 
entities blend into one surviving corporation and the shareholders 
of all become shareholders in the survivor. 73 Therefore, in a sale of 
assets for stock of the purchaser, a de facto merger may be found 
where the buyer continues the seller's business operation, and the 
seller promptly dissolves, distributing the shares of the buyer to its 
shareholders. 74 
The final exception to the general rule of nonassumption is the 
"mere continuation" rule. In its most narrow sense, the exception 
applies to changes in the form of the corporate entity such as re-
69 See text accompanying notes 55-59 supra. 
70 See notes 55-58 and accompanying text supra. For example, if two corporations desire 
to merge, but fear that a number of shareholders of one entity will object, they may simply 
structure the amalgamation as a purchase of the assets of the corporation with assenting 
shareholders by the corporation with some potentially dissenting shareholders. See the lead-
ing case of Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958), where this type of 
sale was held to be a de facto merger and dissenting shareholders were awarded their stat-
utory rights of notification, dissent, and appraisal. Id. at 432, 143A.2d at 28. But see Hariton 
v. Arco Elec., Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 326, 182 A.2d 22 (1962), affd, 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 
(Sup. Ct. 1963), where a similarly structured sale of assets was upheld in the face of chal-
lenge by a dissenting shareholder. The de facto merger doctrine in the context of dissenting 
shareholders rights is discussed in Folk, supra note 57. 
71 A. CONARD, supra note 47, at 1123. 
72 See Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 432, 143 A.2d 25, 28 (1958). The focus in 
such an inquiry is on the substance of the transaction rather than merely the form. See Note, 
supra note 7, at 1318. 
73 See note 43 supra. 
74 See, e.g., Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974) 
(applying New Jersey law); Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250, 1252 (E.D. Wis. 
1973) (applying Wisconsin law); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821-22 (D. 
Colo. 1968) (applying California law); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 
565-67, 264 A.2d 98, 103-05 (L. Div. 1970), affd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 
585 (App. Div. 1972). See also Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 
333, 348-51, 159 A.2d 146, 154-56 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), affd per curiam, 33 N.J. 72, 161 
A.2d 474 (1960); Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 432, 143 A.2d 25, 28 (1958). 
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capitalization, changes in the name of the entity, or changes in the 
state of incorporation. 75 Some decisions have stated that a con-
tinuation may be found where the consideration paid for the sel-
ler's assets was inadequate to satisfy its outstanding obligations. 76 
Other courts have stated that a mere continuation of the seller may 
be found where there was continuity of business operation, man-
agement, directors, officers, and shareholders between the buyer 
and seller, and the seller corporation ceases to exist after the sale is 
consummated. 77 To the extent that this definition includes the ele-
ments of continuity of operation and ownership coupled with the 
prompt dissolution of the seller it would seem to be merely a repeti-
tion of the exception for de facto merger. 78 
3. Case Law - The overlap in the judicial descriptions of the 
four exceptions to the general rule indicate that a particular trans-
fer may be challenged under more than one exception simultane-
ously. Despite some confusion in the decisions as to the exact 
parameters of each exception, it seems clear that a sale of assets 
will not be characterized as a de facto merger or a mere continua-
tion where the consideration paid is adequate cash rather than 
stock in the transferee, and the transferor continues to exist as a 
75 See, e.g., Ozan Lumber Co. v. Davis Sewing Mach. Co., 284 F. 161, 165 (D. Del. 1922), 
where the court described the exception for mere continuation in the following terms: 
[l]n order to recover from a corporation of one name the obligations of a corpora-
tion to another name, upon the theory that the former is a mere continuation of the 
latter, it must appear that the former is the same legal entity .... That is to say, it 
must be the same legal person, having a continued existence under a new name. 
The court in McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., l()C) N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (L. Div. 1970), 
aff'd per curiam, 118 N .J. Super 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972), described the concept 
in similar terms, stating at J()C) N .J. Super. at 570, 264 A.2d at 106, that the purchaser corpor-
ation must in reality "represent merely a 'new hat' for the seller." 
76 See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 366 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert 
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 847, 120 Cal. 
Rptr. 556, 559 (1975). This concern with the adequacy of consideration paid for the assets 
overlaps the exception for mere continuation with that for fraudulent transfer. See text ac-
companying notes 66-69 supra. 
77 See, e.g., Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D. Colo. 1968) (applying 
California law); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., l()C) N.J. Super. 555, 570, 264 A.2d 89, 107 
(L. Div. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972). 
78 See text accompanying note 75 supra. However, a recent decision by the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals significantly broadens the test for a mere continuation of the seller. In Cyr 
v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying New Hampshire law), a corporate 
purchaser of a sale proprietorship for cash was held to be a mere continuation of the seller 
for the purposes of tort liability on the basis of continuity of personnel, management, and 
business operation even though the element of ownership continuity was missing. In so hold-
ing the court stated: "If as a group the same employees continue without pause to produce 
the same products in the same plant, with the same supervision, the ownership of the entity 
which maintains essentially the same name cannot be the sole determinant of liability." Id. 
at 1154. This formulation of the exception to the general rule for a mere continuation of the 
seller represents a radical departure from traditional corporate doctrine governing transferee 
liability by focusing on enterprise continuity rather than continuity of ownership. See Com-
ment, supra note 8, at 105-06. The Cyr decision is discussed in the text accompanying notes 
137-52. 
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separate legal entity for a time following the consummation of the 
sale. As classically formulated, both exceptions presume a con-
tinuity of ownership between the transferor and transferee which is 
not present if the component entities exist after the sale and if the 
consideration paid for the assets is cash. 79 The analysis presented 
in three recent cases80 involving product liability claims against the 
successor to the original manufacturer illustrates how essential the 
concept of ownership continuity is to a finding of successor liability 
under the exceptions for de facto merger or mere continuation. 
79 Note, supra note 7, at 1316. The products liability plaintiff may also argue that the sale 
contract contains an express or implied assumption of the target company's contingent 
liabilities, or that the transaction amounts to a fraudulent attempt to escape liability, but 
these two theories have proven to be less useful in the context of a products liability claim 
than the exceptions for de facto merger or mere continuation. Id. at 1311-12. 
The purchase agreement in a corporate acquisition may, and often does, include the as-
sumption of selected liabilities associated with the continued operation of the business, such 
as outstanding debts to suppliers and contractual obligations. Darrell, supra note 41, 1202-
03. Such specified assumptions, however, do not automatically include responsibility for 
contingent product liability claims. In fact, it is unusual for a purchase agreement to ex-
pressly include an assumption of responsibility for such claims. Note, supra note 7, at 1311. 
This general failure to make contractual provision for future products liability may be at-
tributable to the difficulty of assessing such speculative future obligations accurately, but it 
is more probable that contingent products liability is not directly addressed in such contracts 
because the present legal structure allows both parties to the transfer to effectively avoid 
responsibility for such claims if the transferor dissolves after the sale. See text accompany-
ing notes 55-59 supra. 
It may be argued that a broad contractual assumption of the liabilities associated with ac-
quired assets implies assumption of contingent products liability as well, and at least one 
court has so held. In Bouton v. Litton Indus. Co., 423 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1970), the court held 
that a broad assumption ofliabilities clause in a sale contract coupled with the transferral of 
an existing products liability insurance policy to the purchasing corporation amounted to an 
implied assumption of responsibility for contingent products liability claims. Where the pur-
chase agreement expressly provides for the assumption of certain existing liabilities and de-
nies responsibility for all others, however, it is unlikely that a court would interpret the con-
tract as providing for the assumption of contingent claims. Thus, as a practical matter, this 
exception provides the courts with little flexibility in developing a doctrine expressive of the 
needs of the products liability plaintiff. 
The exception for fraudulent transfer is primarily intended to provide a remedy for known 
claimants of the transferor corporation against the assets in the hands of the transferee cor-
poration where inadequate consideration renders the transferor unable to meet its obliga-
tions. See notes 66-69 supra. Where the consideration paid was adequate to satisfy known 
obligations, and there is no proof of actual intent to defraud existing or future claimants, the 
transferee may not be held accountable. 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 15, § 7330. In practice, 
therefore, even though the fear of contingent product liability claims may be a primary mo-
tive behind the transferor's decision to sell, where adequate consideration is received for the 
assets it may be impossible for a subsequent products liability plaintiff to prove fraudulent 
intent. But see note 41 supra. 
Under Section 7 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, a subsequent claimant, 
such as a products liability plaintiff, may recover against the transferee under the theory of 
fraudulent transfer if he can show intent "to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or fu-
ture creditors," even though the claimant cannot demonstrate an intent to defraud him per-
sonally. To date, no products liability plaintiff has recovered against a transferee ofassets on 
this theory. Note, supra note 7, at 1312 n.49. 
8° Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (applying California 
law); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (L. Div. 1970), afj'd 
per curiam, I 18 N.J. Super. 480,288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972); Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 
358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973). For a useful discussion of these cases see Comment, 
supra note 8, at 97-99. 
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In Kloberdanz v. Joy Manufacturing Co., 81 the plaintiff was in-
jured by oil drilling equipment manufactured by Web-Wilson sev-
eral years after Web-Wilson had sold most of its tangible and intan-
gible assets to Joy Manufacturing for an adequate cash considera-
tion. The assets were purchased subject to certain liabilities, b4t 
Joy Manufacturing did not voluntarily assume responsibility fo'r 
Web-Wilson's contingent products liability. Web-Wilson invested 
the proceeds of the sale during a ten month period following the 
transfer, but dissolved prior to plaintiff's injury. The plaintiff ar-
gued that the purchase of assets was essentially a de facto merger, 
or, alternatively, that Joy was a mere continuation of Web-Wilson 
because Joy continued to manufacture the same product line under 
the same trade name. The United States district court, applying 
California law, held that despite the continuity of business opera-
tions no de facto merger could be found where the transferor and 
transferee continued to exist separately after the transfer of assets 
was complete. 82 The court held that there could be no finding of 
continuation where there was no common identity of stock, stock-
holders, officers, or directors between Joy and Web-Wilson.83 
On similar facts, a New Jersey superior court held in McKee v. 
Harris-Seybold Co. 84 that a successor corporation could not be 
made responsible for a products liability claim arising from a 
machine produced by its predecessor.85 As in Kloberdanz, the 
plaintiff argued alternatively that the transferee of the assets, 
Harris-Seybold, was merely a continuation of the original manufac-
turer, Seybold, or that the transfer amounted to a de facto merger. 
Even though the contract required the prompt dissolution of 
Seybold upon consummation of the transfer and a portion of the 
consideration was stock in the purchase corporation, the court 
concluded that there was no de facto merger where two distinct 
corporate entities existed for a time following the transfer.86 The 
court also declared that the small amount of stock transferred as 
part of the consideration did not provide sufficient commonality of 
ownership for a finding of continuation. 87 Thus, despite the fact 
81 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (applying California law). 
82 Id. at 822. 
8a Id. 
84 lOON.J. Super. 555,264 A.2d98 (L. Div. 1970),affdpercuriam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 
288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972). The plaintiff in McKee was injured by a machine manufac-
tured by Seybold in 1916. Seybold sold all its assets to Hanis-Seybold Co. for cash and some 
stock before the plaintiff's injury occurred. As part of the contract, Seybold agreed to 
change its name at once and to dissolve as soon as possible, but the dissolution did not actu-
ally occur until a year after the sale was completed. 
85 Id. at 570, 264 A.2d at 106. 
86 Id. at 563-67, 264 A.2d at 103-04. 
81 Id. 
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that Harris-Seybold continued to produce and market under the 
same trade name the products previously manufactured by Harris, 
it was not accountable for an injury caused by a machine produced 
by its predecessor. 88 
In Bazan v. Kux Machine Co., 89 on facts almost identical to 
those presented by McKee, a United States district court sitting in 
Wisconsin cited the Mc Kee analysis with approval. 90 As in 
McKee, the court held that a sale of assets could not be termed a de 
facto merger or a mere continuation where the consideration paid 
was cash and both parties continued to exist after the transfer of 
control of the business operation was complete. 91 
4. Protection of Products Liability Plaintiffs -It is clear that the 
general rule of nonassumption and its four exceptions adequately 
protect the interests of the parties for which they were designed. 92 
The acquiror can control potential future liability associated with 
the ongoing business operation, and so be assured of an accurate 
valuation of the enterprise's worth;93 existing creditors and claim-
ants are assured that sufficient liquid assets will be paid to the sel-
ler corporation to satisfy their claims; 94 and dissenting sharehol-
ders are provided with approval and appraisal rights in transfers 
that resemble a merger. 95 However, the holdings of Kloberdanz, 
McKee, and Bazan demonstrate that the traditional corporate doc-
trine does not adequately protect the interest of an injured products 
liability plaintiff. In those cases, although the business operation 
continued without interruption, the plaintiffs' claims were barred 
because the ownership of the operation had changed and the origi-
nal corporate entity had dissolved. The federal courts were forced 
to define the acquiror's responsibility to the injured plaintiffs by re-
ference to traditional principles of corporate law. No doctrine 
existed in the state laws governing successor responsibility expres-
88 The fact that the injury was caused by a fifty-two year old machine could have influ-
enced the court in its result, but the age of the machine was not a factor in the court's discus-
sion of the propriety of imposing successor liability. 
89 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973). The plaintiff was injured by a machine manufac-
tured by the predecessor of the defendant corporation. Prior to the injury, old Kux Machine 
Co. sold almost all ·its assets to Wickes Corp. for adequate cash consideration. Wickes 
created new Kux Machine Co. to receive the assets. Old Kux changed its name im-
mediately, but did not dissolve until approximately ten months after the sale was completed. 
90 Id. at 1252. 
91 Id. 
92 Tumerv. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 417-18, 244 N.W. 2d 873, 877-78 (1976). 
93 The ability to selectively avoid liabilities associated with an ongoing business, by 
separating the assets from the corporate entity, facilitates the transfer of capital because 
purchasing corporations are able to precisely estimate the risk associated with the acquisi-
tion. See Comment, supra note 8, at 91. 
94 See note 59 supra. 
95 See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra. 
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sive of the peculiar balance of interests presented by a products 
liability claim. 
The problems faced by the products liability plaintiff are unique 
because his claim may not arise until years after the transfer of con-
trol of the business has been achieved. In that setting, the factors of 
adequacy of liquid consideration paid and the physical existence of 
the transferor for a time after the sale is completed, which are cen-
tral to the traditional rules governing transferee liability, seem in-
apposite. Therefore, as a function of the continuing expansion of 
the rights of the users of products, 96 it is reasonable to conclude 
that the existing corporate doctrine should be reexamined in light 
of the special interest of society in providing protection to the con-
sumer, and modified to better reflect that interest in balance with 
the interest of the business community in the accurate estimation 
of future costs. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND THE 
POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
A. Development of the Law . 
Products liability is a rapidly developing branch of tort law under 
which a manufacturer of a defective product may be held responsi-
ble for harm to ultimate users of that product. 97 The doctrine did 
not exist at common law, but arose in this century as ajudicial re-
sponse to the problems created by an increasingly industrialized 
and sophisticated system of production and distribution. 98 Initially, 
the consumer's rights were characterized in terms of negligence or 
96 See generally Gillam, supra note 6; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 
791 (1966); Traynor, supra note 3. 
97 This concept of manufacturer responsibility has found its most widely accepted form in 
Section 402A( I) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965): 
§ 402A Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Con-
sumer. (I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for phys-
ical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) 
the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected 
to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition 
in which it is sold. 
98 One commentator describes the historic shift in the law in this way: 
The origin of caveat emptor is the medieval Christian belief that business is out-
side the law. The buyer has no legal protection and had to rely upon his own sharp-
ness and skepticism; the simplicity of technology and the personal character of 
trade relations made it practical for him to do so. 
[L]aissez faire and the Industrial Revolution modified the principle of caveat 
emptor as they destroyed the conditions under which it was tolerable. The ancient 
mercantile virtues could not cope with an impersonal market, characterized by 
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breach of warranty on the part of the retailer. 99 Thus, the retailer 
could be held responsible for a consumer injury if he failed to use 
the degree of care which a reasonably prudent man would use. 
Typically, his duty was discharged by a reasonable inspection of 
his goods for defects. 1 00 Similarly, the retailer could be found re-
sponsible for a consumer's loss or injury where the goods failed to 
conform to the implied warranty of quality and fitness for the use 
anticipated. 101 Gradually, these concepts were extended to reach 
the manufacturer of the defective product, 1 02 and more recently 
the traditional legal doctrines of negligence and breach of warranty 
have been widely supplanted by the doctrine of strict products lia-
bility .1 03 
Under the theory of strict products liability, a manufacturer or 
any other member of the chain of distribution may be held respon-
sible for an injury to a person resulting from contact with its prod-
uct if the product is shown to have left that entity's control in a 
defective or dangerous condition and if that defect or danger actu-
ally caused the injury. 104 Fault on the part of the manufacturer or 
seller need not be shown, and no contractual relationship need 
exist between the manufacturer and the injured person. 105 One 
specialization, division of labor, systematic exchange, sophisticated finance, cor-
porate organization, and technological complexity. 
* * * 
The modern tendency is to substitute minimal standards of quality and mer-
chantability for the precise bargain the parties made .... Implied warranty is being 
treated as an overhead cost, to be paid by the financially and legally responsible 
element in the chain of distribution and shifted to consumers as a class. 
Gillam, supra note 6, at 119-21. 
99 The law originally couched these principles in terms of the "retailer" because he dealt 
directly with the consumer. This was satisfactory in times past when goods were produced 
to order by local craftsmen. Gillam, supra note 6, at 129. 
100 Id. at 122-23. 
1 01 Id. at 124-28. 
102 W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at §§ 96, 97. A detailed discussion of the development of 
products liability law is beyond the scope of this article. The reader is referred to Gillam, 
supra note 6, which discusses the area in depth with extensive citation to other authorities, 
and to the more recent articles on the rise of the theory of strict products liability cited in 
note 3 supra. 
103 According to Dean Prosser, as of 1971, two-thirds of the states had accepted the 
theory of strict products liability. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 657-58. 
10
• The rule of strict liability in tort was first adopted in the landmark case of Greenman v. 
Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62,377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963): 
"A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing 
that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury 
to a human being." 
105 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A(2)(a) & (b)(1965): 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) [see note 97 supra] applies although (a) The 
seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and 
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller. 
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practical effect of the doctrine has been to ease the burden of proof 
on the injured plaintiff. The widespread adoption of strict products 
liability as the primary theory of recovery in products liability 
cases is therefore indicative of a trend toward· expanding the liabil-
ity of the manufacturer to permit recovery by the broadest possible 
class of injured persons .106 
B. Policy Justifications 
A number of policy considerations are commonly espoused by 
courts and commentators in support of this shift of responsibility 
from the injured person to the manufacturer. One argument for im-
posing responsibility on the manufacturer is that the public interest 
in improved health and safety demands that the law provide affir-
mative protection against dangerous or defective products. 107 This 
recognizes that the manufacturer is best equipped to anticipate and 
guard against potential injuries through improved product design 
and manufacture. To induce continued research and product de-
velopment to this end, the law must force the manufacturer to bear 
the risk posed by product defects. 108 Another common justification 
is that the manufacturer benefits from placing its products in the 
stream of commerce and therefore should bear the burden of the 
See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63,377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. 
Rptr. 697,701 (1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,372, 161 A.2d 69, 
77 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of The Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 840 (1966). . 
10
• This expansion is documented in W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 662-63. 
107 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897, 
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 
P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J. concurring); Assault, supra note 3, at 1119. 
Dean Prosser notes that this argument had its origin in cases involving the sale of adulter-
ated food. There, the public sentiment was so powerful that the strict liability of suppliers 
was deemedjustifid. /d. at 1122-23. Gradually, this notion of strict liability, expressed in the 
form of an implied warranty of safety, was extended to products for intimate bodily use 
(e.g., Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N .E.2d 612 (1958)). And 
after the precedental case, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N .J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 
(1960), the warranty of safety was extended to a wide variety of products. W. PRosSER, 
supra note 8, at 654-55. 
108 One commentator has questioned the validity of this proposition, asserting that the 
existing standards provide sufficient incentive to the manufacturer to produce the safest 
possible product. Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in 
Products -An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938,945 (1957). Professor Plant also notes 
that: 
Id. 
[A] more powerful incentive to make products as safe as possible lies in the desire 
of manufacturers to avoid the danger that their products will develop a reputation 
for being unsafe or defective and therefore be unacceptable to the purchasing pub-
lic, ... the element which is most disturbing to manufacturers is not the potential 
judgment of legal liability but the injury which is done to the reputation of the prod-
uct and its producer. While it may be conceivable that the imposition of strict liabil-
ity could increase in some small measure the pressure upon a few backward manu-
facturers to make their products safe, it is doubtful that it will add very much to 
existing pressures. 
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losses associated with the use of those products. 109 In this way it is 
thought that the costs associated with the use of a particular prod-
uct will be more accurately reflected in its market price. Theoreti-
cally, products that are dangerous will gradually become more 
costly than safer, comparable products and will disappear from the 
marketplace. 110 In the same vein, manufacturers are presumed to 
be better able to absorb the costs flowing from product-related in-
juries than are individual consumers. 111 They have access to in-
formation concerning the potential dangers associated with a par-
ticular product, can more efficiently assess the probable costs, and 
can spread those costs throughout society through insurance and 
price adjustments.112 
10
• See, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 619, 210 N .E.2d 182, 186 (1965); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A Comments C, f (1965); Wade, supra note 2, at 
826. See also Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE 
L.J. 499 (1961). Professor Calabresi notes that '"Enterprise liability' [is] the notion that los-
ses should be borne by the doer, the enterprise, rather than distributed on the basis of fault." 
Id. at 500. 
11° Calabresi, supra note 109, at 502, describes the concept in his explanation of "alloca-
tion of resources": 
One of these [basic postulates], perhaps the most important, is that by and large 
people know what is best for themselves . . . . [I]n order for people to know 
what they really want they must know the relative costs of producing different 
goods. The function of prices is to reflect the actual costs of competing goods, and 
thus to enable the buyer to cast an informed vote in making his purchase. 
Logically, then, the market price of an item can only accurately reflect the actual cost of its 
continued use if the manufacturer is held responsible for every injury associated with it. Un-
reasonably dangerous products will gradually increase in price and market demand will ac-
cordingly decline. 
111 Traynor, supra note 3, at 366; Comment, supra note 8, at 89-90. 
112 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) 
(Traynor, J. concurring), was the first judicial recognition of this concept. 
The purely dispassionate economic assessment that the manufacturer is better equipped 
than is the individual consumer to anticipate and insure against the risk of loss associated 
with a particular product through insurance policies or market price adjustments may well 
be the central impetus behind th·e broad acceptance of strict products liability as the primary 
theory of recovery. In a recent decision, Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 31, 560 P.2d 3,8, 
136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 579 (1977), the California Supreme Court noted that the "paramount pol-
icy" served by strict liability is the shifting of loss from the defenseless victim to the manu-
facturer with its superior risk spreading ability. 
The economic logic embodied in the concept of strict products liability has been a favorite 
topic for commentators. In an excellent discussion tracing the mutations in the common law 
of negligence and implied warranty which characterized the development of products liabil-
ity law, Professor Gillam argues persuasively that the fictions devised by the judiciary to 
mold existing legal doctrine to the needs of the injured consumer are workable but that: 
None of them squarely faces the real issue: as a matter of economic policy should 
the manufacturer be liable without fault to the consumer? Any one of these ap-
proaches in effect imposes strict liability, but the best way to impose it is to impose 
it frankly as the soundest economic policy, rather than as a device for avoiding the 
policy issue .... [l]f absolute liability is found to be called for, it should be im-
posed directly, without fiction or analogy, upon simple grounds of policy .... 
Gillam, supra note 6, at 155. 
More recently, the debate has shifted from whether strict products liability should be 
adopted, to how far the doctrine should extend. Some commentators have proposed that this 
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The expansive character of the doctrine of strict products liabil-
ity and the policy considerations underlying its development 
suggest that the balance of interests represented in the existing 
corporate rule of nonassumption does not adequately reflect the 
interests of the products liability plaintiff. Clearly, it is inconsistent 
with those policies to determine the rights of an injured person as 
against a successor to the original manufacturer by reference to a 
rule that predicates ongoing responsibility on continuity of corpo-
rate ownership rather than on the continued marketing of the prod-
uct that caused the injury. It is not surprising, therefore, that some 
courts sitting in jurisdictions which have embraced the theory of 
strict products liability have suggested that the existing corporate 
rules of transferee liability be modified to more accurately reflect 
the policies embodied in strict products liability .113 
III. JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
GENERAL RULE OF NONASSUMPTION 
Two courts faced with the inconsistency between the general 
rule of nonassumption and the doctrine of strict products liability 
res ponded to the gap in state law by expanding the scope of the de 
facto merger and mere continuation exceptions. 114 Two other 
courts confronted With similar factual settings applied the classic 
corporate rule, but discussed the conflicting policy considerations 
of strict products liability. 1 15 
determination should also be made with reference to the basic economic concept of efficient 
cost allocation. For example, Professors Calabresi and Hirschoff suggest that the cost of 
product-related accidents should be borne by the party who is best equipped to make the 
cost-benefit analysis and act on that determination. They assert that the manufacturer is 
generally in the best position to weigh the potential danger of a particular product against the 
cost of an alternative safe product. Consequently, if the manufacturer markets a product, it 
should bear the resulting losses. Under this theory, the propriety of the manufacturer's deci-
sion is not at issue: superior ability to make the cost-benefit analysis is the key to responsi-
bility. Calabresi & HirschQff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 
(1972). The economic rationale underlying strict products liability is also discussed in J. 
CALABRESI, THE CosT OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); Sym-
posium, Products Liability: Economic Analysis and the Law, 38 CHI. L. REV. I (1970); 
Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 205 (1973). 
113 See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975) (applying Pennsylvania law); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 
1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying New Hampshire law); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 
F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (applying New Jersey law); Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 
Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975). 
114 Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 
U.S. 965 (1975) (applying Pennsylvania law); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (I st Cir. 
1974) (applying New Hampshire law). 
11
• Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co.", 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (applying New 
Jersey law); Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975). 
362 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 12:2 
A. Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co. 
In Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 116 the plaintiff was injured 
by a machine produced by Samuel Langston Co. (SML). Before 
the injury occurred, SML had sold all its assets to a subsidiary of 
Harris Intertype in exchange for stock in Harris. Applying New 
Jersey law, 11 7 the United States district court held that under the 
test for de facto merger announced in McKee 118 the sale of assets 
was essentially equivalent to a de facto merger: the transfer was 
for stock rather than cash and the transferor dissolved immediately 
after the sale was consummated .119 In dicta, the court remarked 
that the defendant corporation should bear the cost of plaintiffs 
product-related injury because it had received the benefits as-
sociated with the acquisition of a going concern. Such losses, the 
court declared, are ''regarded as an economically and socially 
necessary cost of doing business." 120 
B. Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp. 
In another case involving a sale of assets for stock, Knapp v. 
116 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974). 
11 7 It is not completely clear that New Jersey law should have been applied. The accident 
occurred in Michigan and the purchase agreement was executed in Ohio, the location of the 
headquarters of the purchaser, Harris Intertype. The court selected New Jersey law on the 
premise that the ongoing enterprise, Samuel Langston Co., was incorporated and located in 
New Jersey. 
116 The court condensed a rambling discussion of the concept of de facto merger in 
McKee v. Hanis-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 563-67, 264 A.2d 98, 103-05 (1970), into 
four distinct elements: 
(I) There is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation, so that there is 
a continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and general busi-
ness operations. 
(2) There is a continuity of shareholders which results from the purchasing corpora-
tion paying for the acquired assets with shares of its own stock, this stock ulti-
mately coming to be held by the shareholders of the seller corporation so that they 
become a constituent part of the purchasing corporation. 
(3) The seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations, liquidates, and 
dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible. 
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes those liabilities and obligations of the sel-
ler ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal business op-
erations of the seller corporation. 
Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. at 801. See text accompanying notes 69-74 
supra. 
119 Id. at 803. 
120 Id. at 802. The court noted that the price paid for the acquired business would be ad-
justed to take the ongoing responsibility of the new owner into account, and concluded that 
justice could not allow corporations to avoid liabilities that natural persons could not avoid. 
"The solvent natural person cannot avoid his liability for injuries caused by him simply 
by ... changing his name .... Similarly, solvent corporations, going concerns, should 
not be permitted to discharge their liabilities to injured persons simply by shuffling pa-
pers .... " Id. at 803. 
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North American Rockwell Corp., 121 the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law, held that an injured 
plaintiff could seek recovery from a transferee of corporate assets 
for stock even though the transferor continued to exist as a sepa-
rate entity following the sale .1 22 The plain tiff in Knapp was injured 
by a machine produced by Textile Machine Works (TMW). But the 
injury occurred after TMW had sold all its assets to Rockwell in 
exchange for stock, and had dissolved. As part of the purchase 
agreement, the parties stipulated that TMW dissolve as soon as 
possible following the transfer. TMW, however, continued to exist 
as a corporate "shell" for a full eighteen months after the sale. The 
district court granted Rockwell's motion for summary judgment on 
the ground that the transaction was a sale of assets .123 
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the court noted that there was no 
Pennsylvania authority on point, 124 but that a review of cases from 
other jurisdictions suggested that the existence of TMW following 
the transfer coupled with the value of the Rockwell stock paid to 
TMW, made the transfer a sale of assets rather than a de facto 
merger or continuation. 125 Even so, the court declared that the 
"better-reasoned result" would be to treat the transaction as a de 
facto merger.126 The court discussed two recent decisions by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court which it interpreted as demonstrating 
that court's willingness to look to the substance of a transaction 
rather than its form, 127 and to impose the burden of loss on the 
party better able to spread that loss. 128 From those general policy 
statements, the court of appeals concluded that to deny Knapp his 
remedy because of the "barren continuation" of TMW after the 
exchange would be overly formalistic. 129 The court held that al-
though one essential element of a classic de facto merger, prompt 
dissolution of the seller, was not presented by the facts, it was con-
sistent with the social policies adopted by the Pennsylvania Su-
121 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975). 
122 Id. at 370. 
123 Id. at 363. 
12
• Id. at 365. 
12
• Id. at 367. The court specifically discussed the holdings in McKee and Bazan which 
are described in the text accompanying notes 84-91 supra. Additionally, the court discussed 
a Nevada Supreme Court decision, Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 85 Nev. 276, 454 P.2d 24 (1969), in 
which the Nevada Court held a transfer of substantially all the assets of Nevada Land and 
Mortgage Co. to Leroy Corp. for stock to be a sale of assets. 
126 Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d at 367. 
127 Id. at 368, citing the seminal case on de facto merger, Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 
Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958). 
12
• Id. at 369, citing Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584,305 A.2d 877 
(1973), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of immunity in suits 
involving local government because the governmental body was better able to prevent the 
injury, and better able to spread the loss throughout the community. 
12
• Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d at 368-69. 
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pre me Court to rule the transfer a de facto merger. 1 30 
The decision in Knapp clearly demonstrates the belief of that 
federal court that, despite overwhelming precedent to the contrary, 
corporate law should provide a remedy for post-dissolution 
products-related injuries where the transferee continues the busi-
ness operation. But federal courts are not free to modify or aug-
ment state law. They are constrained by the Erie doctrine131 to 
apply a state's law as declared by its highest court. Consequently, 
the Knapp court framed its analysis in terms of the exception for de 
facto merger, but modified the universally-accepted elements of 
the exception to reflect general policy statements made by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in contexts totally unrelated to the 
question of transferee liability. Apparently, in pursuit of the 
"better-reasoned result" 132 the court was only too willing to dis-
count the importance of one time-honored factor distinguishing a 
sale of assets from a merger: the separateness of transferor and 
transferee after the transaction. 
Concurring in the result, Judge Rosenn argued133 that Pennsyl-
vania's corporation law was designed to protect tort claimants as 
well as dissenting shareholders prejudiced by the mode of acquisi-
tion, but that their unique relationship to the corporation suggested 
that a court must look for different attributes of merger for the pur-
poses of imposing tort liability on the successor corporation. 134 He 
proposed a test for successor tort liability based on two factors: ( 1) 
that the successor acquires control of an ongoing business, and (2) 
that the transferor corporation dissolves after distribution to its 
shareholders of the consideration received in the transaction .1 35 
Even though Knapp was framed in terms of the existing excep-
tion for de facto merger, the opinion represents a radical departure 
from previous cases. Rather than simply apply the existing corpo-
rate principles to the facts, the Knapp court reexamined the effec-
tiveness of the general rule of nonassumption and its exceptions in 
light of the development of public policy favoring recovery for 
product-related injuries. Finding the existing rule unresponsive to 
the needs of that class of injured persons, the court modified exist-
130 Id. at 370. 
131 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie the Supreme Court per Justice 
Brandeis declared that "[t]here is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to 
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State, whether they be local in their 
nature or 'general' .... "Id. at 78. Thus, federal courts sitting in diversity are compelled to 
apply the law of the appropriate jurisdiction as interpreted by the Supreme Court of that 
jurisdiction. 
132 Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d at 367. 
133 Id. at 370. 
134 Id. at 370-71. 
135 Id. at 371. 
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ing doctrine to balance the interests of the products liability plain-
tiff and the parties to a sale of an ongoing enterprise. 
C. Cyr v. B. Offen & Co. 
Since Knapp involved a sale of assets for stock, the court of ap-
peals did not reach the question of successor liability for post-
dissolution products-related claims in a sale of assets for cash. That 
problem was addressed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Cyr 
v. B. Offen & Co. 136 In Cyr,the plaintiffs were severely burned by a 
drying oven on a printing press. The oven was manufactured by a 
sole proprietorship, B. Offen Co. Before the accident occurred, the 
owner had died and a group of employees had formed a corpora-
tion, B. Offen & Co., Inc., which purchased the business from the 
estate for cash. Under the terms of the purchase agreement the 
corporation was obligated to continue the business without sub-
stantial modification. It continued to service and renovate existing 
drying ovens and marketed ovens under the B. Offen trademark. 
Existing customers were not advised that a change in ownership 
had taken place. The plaintiffs argued on these· facts that the cor-
poration was essentially a continuation of the sole proprie-
torship.137 The district court agreed and submitted the plaintiffs' 
claims of negligence and strict products liability to the jury. 138 
On appeal, the First Circuit noted that New Hampshire courts 
had not announced a rule of successor liability for product-related 
injuries. 139 New Hampshire did have a statutory provision preserv-
ing creditor's claims after corporate dissolution,140 and the state 
judiciary had accepted the doctrine of strict products liability .141 
The Cyr court therefore assumed that New Hampshire would favor 
a rule preserving post-dissolution product-related claims. Addi-
tionally, the court assumed that New Hampshire's judiciary would 
adopt the universally-accepted exceptions to the general rule of 
nonassumption. 142 The facts of the case did not demonstrate the 
continuity of ownership essential to a finding of de facto merger 
nor was there evidence of fraud. 143 The Cyr court concluded that 
136 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying New Hampshire law). 
137 Id.at 1151. 
138 Id. at 1149. 
139 Id. at 1150-51. 
140 Id. at 1153. New Hampshire had adopted a postponement of abatement statute which 
provided a three year period following corporate dissolution in which the dissolved corpora-
tion could still be sued. For a discussion of postponement of abatement statutes see text 
accompanying notes 22-34 supra. 
141 Id. at 1150. 
142 Id. at 1152. 
143 Id. at 1151. 
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imposing responsibility on B. Offen & Co. would be appropriate 
only if there was sufficient continuity to characterize it as the mere 
continuation of its predecessor.144 
Asserting that existing case law did not provide an appropriate 
test of continuation for the purposes of negligence or strict prod-
ucts liability claims, 145 the court reasoned that sufficient continuity 
would exist if the considerations justifying the liability of the origi-
nal manufacturer were generally applicable to the successor. 146 
According[y, the court reviewed the policy considerations under-
pinning the strict products liability of an original manufacturer and 
concluded that they applied with sufficient force to a successor that 
continued the manufacture and servicing of the same line of 
equipment. 147 Additionally, the court held that the principle of re-
spond eat superior which imposes responsibility on an employer for 
the negligent acts of its employees would apply as well to a succes-
sor who continues to manufacture the same products in the same 
144 Id. at 1153. 
145 Id. at 1152. Actually, authority did exist for the proposition that a transaction should 
not be characterized as a de facto merger or mere continuation, even in the context of prod-
uct liability claims, where both entities existed after the transfer and where the consideration 
paid was cash. See text accompanying notes 81-91 supra. The Cyr court did discuss one of 
these cases, Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co. There, the court observed, no continuity was found 
because the seller and buyer both existed after the sale and the buyer did not assume the 
seller's name. 501 F .2d at 1152 n.13. Kloberdanz is discussed in the text accompanying notes 
81-83 supra. 
146 Id. at 1154. The court mentioned four policy justifications which support the imposi-
tion of strict products liability on the original manufacturer: 
Id. 
(I) the manufacturer is better able to protect itself and bear the costs while the con-
sumer is helpless; (2) it is the manufacturer which has launched the product into the 
channels of trade; (3) it is the manufacturer which has violated the representation of 
safety implicit in putting the product into the stream of commerce; and (4) the 
manufacturer is the instrumentality to look to for improvement of the product's 
quality. 
147 Applying these principles to the successor, the court reasoned: 
The very existence of strict liability for manufacturers implies a basic judgment that 
the hazards of predicting and insuring for risks from defective products are better 
borne by the manufacturer than by the consumer. The manufacturer's successor, 
carrying over the experience and expertise of the manufacturer, is likewise in a bet-
ter position than the consumer to gauge the risks and the costs of meeting them. 
The successor knows the product, is as able to calculate the risk of defects as the 
predecessor, is in position to insure therefor and reflect such cost in sale negotia-
tions, and is the only entity capable of improving the quality of the product. 
••• 
[l]t is true that the successor, by definition, was not the legal entity which launched 
the product on the stream of commerce or made an implied representation as to its 
safety. But in the most real sense it is profiting from an exploiting [of] all of the 
accumulated good will which the products have earned, both in its outward rep-
resentations of continuity and in its internal adherence to the same line of equip-
ment. 
Id. at 1154. 
WINTER 1979) Developments in Successor Liability 367 
plant with the same workers. 148 The First Circuit therefore upheld 
the lower court's ruling that B. Offen & Co. was a mere continua-
tion of its predecessor and could be sued for the negligence or strict 
products liability of that enterprise. 149 In so doing, the Cyr court 
modified the classic configuration of the exception for mere con-
tinuation1 50 in the context of product-related claims by eliminating 
the element of continuity of ownership. 
The Cyr opinion represents a positive step toward a rule of suc-
cessor liability tailored to meet the particular needs of the products 
liability plaintiff. By eliminating the factor of ownership continuity 
from the determination of continuation, the court devised a rule of 
transferee liability which is probably more in keeping with the ex-
pectations of consumers. Presumably, public opinion as to product 
reliability and manufacturer responsibility is influenced more by 
continuity in the outward appearance of a manufacturing enterprise 
than by continuity in its ownership. Even so, the Cyr court did not 
specify which elements of continuity would be minimally neces-
sary for a finding of mere continuation in product liability cases. 
Since B. Offen & Co. was essentially identical to its predecessor in 
every respect save one, 151 the opinion provides little guidance for 
courts seeking to define the scope of the concept of mere continua-
tion in future post-dissolution products liability cases where the 
successor differs from its predecessor in several respects, but the 
basic identity of the enterprise has survived the transfer of control. 
Troublesome too, for future cases, is the organizational structure 
of the court's discussion of the various policies favoring the impos-
ition of successor liability. Because the case was brought on the 
theory of negligence as well as strict products liability, the First 
Circuit discussed the rationales underlying the theories of respon-
d eat superior and strict products liability. 152 But the concepts are 
intermingled. The Cyr court failed to carefully distinguish which 
factors of continuity are essential to a finding of continuation in a 
negligence claim as opposed to strict products liability. The opin-
148 Id. Presumably, the court emphasized the corporation's responsibility for the negli-
gence of its employees because the case was argued and decided on the theory of negligence 
as well as strict products liability. Successor responsibility for the torts of its predecessor's 
employees may be justified when the successor represents itself as equivalent to the proprie-
torship. For a more detailed discussion of the use of this principle in imposing successor 
liability, see the text accompanying notes 186-90 infra. 
,.. Id. 
150 See text accompanying notes 75-79 supra. 
151 The same employees and managers produced the same products in the same physical 
plant under the same trademark, before and after the sale of assets. The corporation pur-
chased the goodwill and agreed to fulfill the contract obligations of its predecessor. It con-
tinued the service and renovation of existing units in the field and even represented itself to 
its customers and the public as a forty year old business. The only element of the proprie-
torship missing was the owner, Bernard Offen. 501 F.2d at ll51. 
152 Id. at ll54. 
368 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 12:2 
ion implies that the continued presence of the negligent employees 
of the proprietorship in the successor corporation is an essential 
factor in the finding of continuation, but the theory of strict prod-
ucts liability does noUocus on the behavior of particular individu-
als such as supervisors or employees. Rather, it imposes responsi-
bility for a person's injury on the manufacturer because that entity 
is in a better position than the individual to anticipate the loss, 
spread the cost throughout society, and minimize the risk of future 
losses through product improvement. 153 Therefore, though con-
tinuity of management and employees might be a relevant factor in 
the determination of continuation for a negligence claim, it should 
be immaterial in a decision to impose strict products liability. The 
casual juxtaposition of these two distinct legal doctrines in the Cyr 
opinion may prove to be a source of confusion in future cases 
brought solely on the theory of strict products liability. As written, 
the opinion could be misinterpreted as standing for the proposition 
that personnel continuity is an essential factor in determination of 
mere continuation for the purpose of any product-related claim .154 
D. Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe 
A California decision, Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 155 was the first 
opinion in a state court to acknowledge the gap between the tradi-
tional rule of nonassumption and the policies underlying products 
liability law. Ortiz was injured by a press made by Johnson 
Machine & Press Co. Sometime prior to the injury, Johnson sold 
its assets to Bontrager Corp. Bontrager assumed responsibility for 
Johnson's existing and future liabilities under the de facto merger 
doctrine .156 Later, Bontrager sold all its assets including the corpo-
rate "shell" of Johnson to South Bend Lathe for adequate cash 
consideration. As a part of the agreement, Bontrager promptly dis-
solved and the Johnson "shell" was subsequently dissolved by 
South Bend Lathe. 
On those facts the California Appellate Court held that, under 
the traditional principles governing successor responsibility, South 
Bend's liability was limited to the value of the assets it received in 
153 See text accompanying notes 104-12 supra. 
154 The Cyr opinion has been discussed by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Wal-
lach, supra note 18, at 338; Juenger & Schulman, supra note 8, at 51-55; Note, 
Corporations-Successor's Tort Liability for Acts or Omissions of Predecessor, 16 B.C. IN-
DUS. & COM. L. REv. 676 (1975); Comment, supra note 8, at 102-06; Note, supra note 7, at 
1320-22; Note, Products Liability-Liability of Transferee for Defective Products Manufac-
tured by Transferor; 30 VAND. L. REV. 238, 244-46 (1977); Long, Products Liability-
Corporations, Asset Sales and Successor Liability, 44 TENN. L. REV. 905, 911-12 (1977). 
155 46 Cal. App.3d 842; 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975). 
156 For a description of this doctrine see text accompanying notes 69-74 supra. 
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the voluntary dissolution of the Johnson "shell," which was 
zero. 157 In a well-reasoned dissent, Associate Justice Fleming 
noted the uninterrupted operation of the manufacturing enterprise 
under the Johnson trademark despite the numerous mutations in 
corporate form. He insisted that the continuity of business opera-
tion alone should be sufficient support for a finding of successor 
liability in a product-related claim. 1 58 
The judicial commentary presented in Shannon, Knapp, Cyr, 
and the dissent in Ortiz is indicative of a developing awareness that 
the traditional corporate rules governing transferee liability cannot 
provide the degree of protection for the consumer mandated by the 
policy assumptions underlying products liability law. Federal 
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction, however, are powerless to 
change state law. They may only attempt to effectuate the policy 
favoring recovery for product-related injuries through a liberalized 
interpretation of the factors comprising the existing exceptions to 
the general rule of nonassumption. While this gradual mutation of 
traditional doctrine does provide relief to product liability plaintiffs 
where none was previously available, it does so in a piecemeal 
manner and at the expense of businessmen who will be unable to 
accurately predict the potential risk associated with the acquisition 
of particular assets. A better long-term solution would be the de-
velopment of a rule of successor liability specifically for product-
related claims. Such a rule should strike an equitable balance be-
tween the interest of the injured plaintiff in recovery and the inter-
est of the business community in the accurate valuation of ongoing 
enterprises. 
IV. THE FORMULATION OF A NEW TEST 
FOR DETERMINING TRANSFEREE LIABILITY 
Two state supreme courts recently responded to the need for a 
special rule of transferee responsibility in products liability 
157 Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 45 Cal. App.3d at 847, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 559. 
158 In dissent, Associate Justice Fleming declared that: 
[A) manufacturer of heavy machinery who undertakes to carry on an existing busi-
ness must take the good with the bad, and the bad includes defective product[s) 
liability. 
• •• 
So long as the business retains its distinctive identity and character and continues 
to be operated as it has in the past, defective product[s) liability adheres to the bus-
iness and remains there untij discharged by bankruptcy or comparable judicial act. 
Id. at 850-51, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 560-61. 
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cases.159 After reviewing the purposes of the traditional rules gov-
erning transferee liability to general creditors, and the purposes of 
products liaqility law, both courts concluded that a new rule was 
essential to the equitable disposition of such cases. Each court de-
veloped, however, somewhat different criteria for imposing suc-
cessor responsibility in products liability cases. Unfortunately, a 
convincing case may be made for the proposition that there should 
be one universally-accepted test for determining successor liability 
in these cases. The task of accurately valuing business assets is 
rendered more difficult if the responsibility for future products lia-
bility claims depends upon the jurisdiction in which the injury oc-
curs. The consistency with which the general rule of nonassump-
tion and its exceptions has been applied is strong evidence of the 
pervasive need in business negotiations for predictability in the 
law: without it, meaningful long-range planning is impossible. With 
this interest in mind, the relative merits of the two state tests for 
successor liability in product-related claims will be critically 
examined to determine what factors noted by the courts should be 
included in that one ideal test. 
A. The Michigan Test 
In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 160 the appellant was in-
jured by a power press manufactured by the T. W.&C.B. Sheridan 
Co. (Old Sheridan). Years before the injury, Old Sheridan had sold 
all its assets to a subsidiary of Harris Intertype Corp. (New Sheri-
dan) for adequate cash consideration. In compliance with their 
agreement, Old Sheridan dissolved after the sale. In 1968, New 
Sheridan merged with its parent company, Harris Intertype, and 
was renamed the Sheridan Division.161 
Relying principally on the policy discussion presented in Shan-
non v. Samuel Langston Co., 162 Turner, the injured party, argued 
that although Old Sheridan's assets had been transferred for cash 
consideration, New Sheridan should be held accountable for 
product-related claims arising from the use of products marketed 
by its predecessor since New Sheridan represented itself publicly 
159 Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406,244 N.W. 2d 873 (1976); Ray v. Alad 
Corp., 19 Cal.3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). 
160 397 Mich. 406,244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). 
161 Id. at 408, 244 N.W.2d at 875-76. At the time this case came before the Michigan Su-
preme Court, Bituminous Casualty Co., the worker's compensation insurance carrier for the 
plaintiff's employer, Seaman Manufacturing Co., was no longer a party to the suit. Id. 
162 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974). See text accompanying notes 116-20 supra for a 
discussion of Shannon. 
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as Old Sheridan.163 Predictably, the respondent asserted that New 
Sheridan was immune from suit under the "general rule of non-
liability." 164 The court held that an action for damages could be 
maintained against the successor, New Sheridan, despite the fact 
that the acquisition was for cash consideration, under its newly-
created exception to the general rule of nonassumption designed 
especially to define successor liability for products liability 
claims.16s 
The court declared that responsibility for a product-related in-
jury should not be fixed by reference to principles developed to 
protect business creditors and minority shareholders. Such princi-
ples are likely to be unresponsive to the "substantially different 
problems associated with products liability torts." 166 The court 
observed that the legitimate concerns of the parties affected by a 
products liability claim against the successor to the original manu-
facturer are identical no matter which acquisition technique is 
selected .167 Therefore, though commonality of ownership between 
163 In Shannon, the use of stock as consideration provided sufficient continuity of owner-
ship between the transferor and transferee entities to support a finding of transferee liability 
under the traditional test for de facto merger, but the court also declared that "the public 
policy behind the evolving common law of products liability is that the enterprise, the going 
concern, ought to bear the liability for the damages done by its defective products." Id. at 
~2. The Michigan Court noted that the same policy considerations were present in Turner. 
397 Mich. at 414,244 N.W.2d at 876. 
164 Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. at 417, 244 N.W.2d at 878. The court 
acknowledged that the general rule of nonassumption and its exceptions were the law in 
Michigan. Id. at 417 n.3, 244 N.W.2d at 878 n.3. 
165 Id. at 430-31, 244 N.W.2d at 883-84. 
166 Id. at 418, 244 N. W .2d at 878. 
167 The court declared that an injured person's interest in recovery is substantially the 
same whether the control of the ongoing business is transferred through a statutory merger, 
sale of assets for stock, or sale of assets for cash. Similarly, whatever form the acquisition 
takes, a primary concern of the business is the accurate assessment of the risk of future 
liabilities and, therefore, the appropriate sale price for the enterprise. Id. at 419, 244 N .W.2d 
at 878. 
The court recognized that avoiding poteniial products liability claims could be a signifi-
cant factor in the selection of the mode of transfer, but dismissed that.purpose as illegiti-
mate. 
[I]t seems both unfair and unbelievable that a corporate combination or acquisition 
decision would be principally or exclusively made on the basis of cutting off the 
contingent right to sue of a products liability victim. 
* * * 
[[]f there are no real business reasons for choosing a cash acquisition of corporate 
assets and the only real reason is to avoid products liability suits, then it would 
seem that the machinery of corporate law is unreasonably geared up to accomplish 
a purpose not really intended for it or in the public interest. 
Id. at 422-23. Actually, a transfer motivated solely by the desire to avoid potential products 
liability claims could be challenged as fraudulent. The transferee could then be forced to 
assume liability even under the traditional corporate rules. See text accompanying notes 
65-68 supra. However, there are a number of valid business considerations which affect the 
selection of a particular mode of transfer. Consequently, it could be difficult for an injured 
plaintiff to prove that the change in corporate structure was motivated by a desire to evade 
potential products liability claims. See note 79 sup,~. but see note 41 supra. 
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a transferor and transferee in a transaction framed as a sale of as-
sets should clearly provide a sufficient nexus to justify forcing suc-
cessor assumption of existing liabilities, the absence of such com-
monality should not, of itself, preclude the imposition of responsi-
bility for products liability claims. 168 The court concluded that a 
better rule of successor liability for product-related claims could be 
devised by reference to the principles underlying products liability 
law.169 
The Michigan court approved the conclusion reached in Cyr, 1 70 
that a mere continuation in the context of products liability claims 
should be determined by reference to two criteria: the extent to 
which the successor entity has assumed the ability of the original 
manufacturer to predict and insure for the risk of injury from its 
defective products, and the extent to which the successor profits 
from the goodwill developed by its predecessor through a deliber-
ate public representation of business continuity. 171 The court 
found that New Sheridan intended to maintain as much continuity 
of product line, personnel, and business practice with Old Sheridan 
as possible. Therefore, it concluded that "(j]ustice would be of-
fended" if New Sheridan could represent itself as Old Sheridan for 
the purpose of sales and the law did not then stop it from denying 
that identity for the purpose of responsibility for product-related in-
168 Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. at 422, 244 N .W. 2d at 880. The court noted 
that commonality of ownership is logically a strong justification for imposing successor lia-
bility because it is equitable to impose the debts of the predecessor on the successor where 
the ownership remains the same. However, this logic breaks down in the context of products 
liability claims. In the time between the sale of assets and the injury the stock may have 
changed hands many times. Thus the court concluded that the distinction between a sale of 
assets for stock and one for cash should not be a crucial factor in determining successor 
responsibility for product-related injuries. 
Certainly, the notion that the owners should continue to bear responsibility for the busi-
ness' debts despite mutations in corporate form is a convincing abstract justification fort he 
distinction in the traditional rules between a sale of assets for cash and one for stock. How-
ever, there is a purely pragmatic reason for the distinction as well. When assets are ex-
changed for cash consideration, the transferor will presumably have sufficient liquidity after 
the transfer to satisfy outstanding obligations. But if the exchange is made for stock in the 
transferee, liquidity may be substantially impaired. If the transferee's shares are publicly 
traded, the transferor should be able to sell them and acquire the liquidity necessary to meet 
its outstanding obligations. Shares that are not readily marketable may prove difficult to 
convert into cash. Thus, in designing a rule to protect the interests of creditors, it makes 
sense to draw a distinction between the two types of consideration. A product-related in-
jury, however, may not occur until many years after the transferor has dissolved. Once the 
consideration paid for transferor's assets has been distributed to its shareholders, the injured 
plaintiff's problem of recovery is equally difficult whether the consideration was stock in the 
transferee or cash. Clearly, there are practical as well as theoretical arguments against ap-
plying the traditional rules of successor liability in the context of a products liability claim. 
See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra. 
169 Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. at 423, 244 N.W. 2d at 880. 
110 Id. at 424-25, 244 N.W. 2d at 881, citing Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1153-54. Cyr is discussed in 
the text accompanying notes 136-54 supra. 
171 Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. at 424-25, 244 N.W. 2d at 881. 
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juries .1 72 Additionally, the court announced a special test for de-
termining continuity in products liability cases comprised of three 
elements: (1) continuity of the outward appearance of the enter-
prise, its management, personnel, physical plant, assets, and busi-
ness operation; (2) dissolution of the seller corporation as soon 
after the transfer of assets as is legally and practically possible; and 
(3) assumption by the transferee of those liabilities and obligations 
necessary to the uninterrupted continuation of normal business op-
erations .1 73 When these factors are present, according to the court, 
a prima facie case of corporate continuity for the purpose of prod-
uct liability claims exists. 
1. Enterprise Continuity - Although the Turner court charac-
terized these factors as demonstrating a "continuity of interest" 174 
between the transferor and transferee rather than enterprise con-
tinuity, the test is actually indistinguishable from the expanded de-
finition of mere continuation adopted in Cyr. 175 Just as in Cyr, the 
central factor of the Michigan test is continuity of the outward ap-
pearance of the business. By focusing on enterprise continuity 
rather than continuity of product line, the Michigan test injects an 
element of individual fault of the business entity into the analysis 
which is superfluous in light of the policy considerations espoused 
by the court. 176 Those policies support the imposition of liability 
172 Id. at 426,244 N.W. 2d at 882. Evidently, the Michigan Court was unwilling to impose 
successor liability solely on the dispassionate economic determination that New Sheridan 
was the most logical and efficient entity to bear the loss. The court's reliance on the equita-
ble principle of estoppel suggests that it believes that successor liability should tum on a 
showing that the successor's outward appearance of continuity with its predecessor oper-
ates as a fraud or misrepresentation on users of the predecessor's products. Thus, the 
Michigan court's conclusion of successor responsibility was based both on what it perceived 
as a wrongful act on the part of New Sheridan and on the economic consideratios of risk 
spreading ability and efficient cost allocation. 
173 Rather than list these elements in the opinion, the Turner court referred to the first, 
third, and fourth elements of the Shannon test for determining de facto merger. Id. at 429, 
244 N.W. 2d at 883. The Shannon test for de facto merger is reproduced in its entirety in 
note 118 supra. The Shannon opinion is discussed in the text accompanying notes 116-20 
supra. 
174 Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. at 429, 244 N.W. 2d at 883. 
1
'" The Cyr test for mere continuation is discussed in the text accompanying notes 146-50 
supra. Even though the Turner court essentially reaffirmed the enterprise continuity ap-
proach of Cyr, the creation of a special exception for products liability cases is an improve-
ment over merely modifying the existing test for mere continuation. In this way, the special 
interests of the products liability plaintiff can be served while the integrity of the classic for-
mulation of the rule and its exceptions is preserved for all other cases. 
The Michigan court did not acknowledge the danger inherent in the progressive modifica-
tion of the existing exceptions, but the California Supreme Court in Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 
Cal. 3d 22, 30,560 P.2d 3,8, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 579(1977), refused to modify the existing rule 
to embrace the special requirements of the products liability plaintiff because the precedent 
could possibly have an unexpected effect on a transferee's liability to the transferor's gen-
eral creditors. Note, Products Liability - Liability of Transferee for Defective Products 
Manufactured by Transferor, 30 VAND. L. REV. 238, 249 (1977). 
176 Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. at 425,244 N.W. 2d at 881. 
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on the party best equipped to assess the risks associated with the 
use of a product, reduce those risks through improved product 
safety, and spread the cost of those injuries resulting from the use 
of the product through market price adjustments .1 77 The physical 
characteristics of a business are totally immaterial to such a deter-
mination. The ability to spread risk of loss and improve product 
safety necessarily follows from the manufacture and distribution of 
the product regardless of the name or physical appearance of the 
manufacturer. It is commonly said, and the Turner court as-
serted,178 that public expectation is tied to the continuity of enter-
prise identity. As a practical matter, however, it may be postulated 
that the public is more often familiar with a particular product 
trademark than with its manufacturer .1 79 Thus, public expectations 
as to a product's suitability and safety are probably related more to 
its trademark than to familiarity with the identity of the manufac-
turing entity. Liability should therefore be imposed on a successor 
to the original manufacturer if it continues to market the product 
that caused the injury and benefits from the public's acceptance of 
that product's trademark, whether the successor represents itself 
as the continuation of the original manufacturer or not. 180 
Because the Michigan test of successor continuity is framed in 
broader terms than the underlying policies mandate, it may not al-
ways impose transferee liability in a manner consistent with those 
policies. In a situation where the transferee purchases the right to 
produce a particular product under an existing trademark without 
acquiring any other assets of the transferor, it is clear that the 
transferee will benefit from the accumulated goodwill associated 
with that trademark. Moreover, the transferee will be in the best 
position to anticipate and provide for the cost of injury through ad-
justments in the market price of that product. Yet under the test of 
successor responsibility devised by the Turner court, it is not cer-
tain that an injured plaintiff could maintain a claim against _that 
transferee. The physical elements of enterprise continuity em-
phasized by the Michigan court might not be present. On the other 
hand, where a purchaser acquires all the assets of a manufacturing 
entity and assumes all the outward semblances of continuity, the 
Michigan rule would appear to hold that purchaser responsible for 
all subsequent product-related injuries even in cases where the par-
ticular product was discontinued long before the transfer of control 
177 See text accompanying notes 107-12 supra. 
178 Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. at 425, 244 N.W. 2d at 881. 
1 79 In fact, the doctrine of strict products liability assumes that the consumer may not 
even know the identity of the manufacturer of the products he uses. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m. (1965). 
1 80 See text accompanying note 110 supra. 
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occurred. While it is evident that the original manufacturer cannot 
avoid responsibility for product-related injuries merely by ceasing 
the production of a product line, it is more difficult to justify the 
imposition of liability on a transferee that never produced or mar-
keted the particular product that caused the injury. Such imposi-
tion would not stimulate improved product safety if the product 
were no longer produced, and the transferee would be unable to 
accurately reflect the cost to society of that product's use through 
adjustments in its market price. 181 Moreover, if the product is not 
marketed by the transferee, that entity has not made express or 
implied representations as to its safety. Nor has the transferee de-
rived a benefit against which the cost of injury should be asses-
sed .182 Of course, generally speaking a business entity should be in 
a better position to absorb and spread the cost of injury than an 
individual, but superior risk-spreading ability alone should not 
provide sufficient justification for the imposition of successor lia-
bility. Notably, courts have limited imposition of liability based on 
the manufacturer's superior risk-spreading ability to those situa-
tions where the shift of responsibility will encourage improved 
product safety and assure a market price that accurately reflects 
the full cost of the product to society .183 In practical application, 
therefore, it is possible that the Michigan test will yield results in-
consistent with the policies cited as justifying the shift of responsi-
bility. 
There are several possible explanations for the Michigan court's 
decision to frame its test of transferee liability in terms of enter-
prise rather than product line continuity. Conceivably, the court 
simply did not realize that a test emphasizing enterprise continuity 
rather than product line continuity is inconsistent with the policies 
it had approved. Three earlier opinions1 84 proposed tests of trans-
181 The transferee could spread the cost of injury through price adjustments in currently 
marlceted products, but those prices would not then accurately reflect the true cost to soci-
ety of the continued use of the allegedly defective product. The theory of efficient cost allo-
cation requires that every cost generated by the use of a particular product be reflected in-
that product's market price: that is, "the activity of making the particular product should 
pay its own way." Wade, supra note 2, at 826. 
182 The goodwill generated by the sale of discontinued products is an asset and its value 
would be reflected in the purchase price of the enterprise. 
183 If superior risk-spreading ability alone provided sufficientjustification for the imposi-
tion of strict products liability, the manufacturer would be virtually an insurer. Wade, supra 
note 2, at 828. The scope and extent of strict products liability has been limited such that the 
imposition is consistent with the recognized public policies which initially suggested the 
need for additional consumer protection. Assault, supra note 3, at 1134. 
1 84 Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (I st Cir. 1974) (discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 136-54 supra); Ray v. Alad Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 855, 127 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1976), 
superceded by Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977) (dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 242-50 infra); Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. 
App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975) (discussed in the text accompanying notes 155-58 
supra. 
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feree liability based on the policies of strict liability but framed in 
terms of enterprise continuity. Even so, the court had access to a 
discussion of a test based on product line continuity. A law review 
article cited in the opinion proposed a test of transferee liability 
based on the degree of product control acquired in the transfer. 1 85 
Therefore, it is more re~sonable to assume that the Michigan court 
adopted a test of transferee liability framed in terms of enterprise 
continuity in full realization that such a test necessarily includes an 
element of entity accountability for fault inconsistent with the con-
cept of strict products liability. 
2. Estoppel - Although the Turner court approved the analysis 
of policy considerations presented in Cyr, 186 its own holding was 
not based on them exclusively. Rather, the court declared that be-
cause a products liability claim was presented, the finding of trans-
feree responsibility must be based partly on the principle of estop-
pel. That is, New Sheridan's affirmative representation that it was 
the continuation of Old Sheridan for the purpose of sales was held 
to estop it from denying it was the same as Old Sheridan for the 
purpose of products liability claims.187 
Estoppel in that context is an equitable notion that one's rep-
resentations may preclude the assertion of rights inconsistent with 
such representations as against someone who has changed his posi-
tion in reliance on the representations. 188 The court's assertion 
that consumer reliance on the transferee's representations is an es-
sential prerequisite to a finding of successor responsibility may 
have dictated that the court frame its test in terms of enterprise 
continuity. An enterprise may be said to make representations; a 
product cannot. If this is the explanation for the court's position, it 
may be argued that the use of the doctrine of estoppel against the 
successor of the original manufacturer for its representations of en-
terprise continuity is improper. In such cases, the injured plaintiff's 
reliance, if any, was probably induced by representations made by 
the original manufacturer rather than the transferee. Few plaintiffs 
would be able to demonstrate that their injury was related to their 
185 397 Mich. at 418,244 N. W. 2d at 878, citing Comment, supra note 8. There, the au-
thor suggests that the affirmative acts of the transferee in assuming control of the manufac-
ture and/or servicing of a particular product might be said to create a duty to persons injured 
by previously marketed units of that product line. The notion of a duty arising as a result of 
affirmative acts of the transferee is conceptually quite different from the dispassionate 
economic determination of the most efficient entity to bear the loss mandated by the doc-
trine of strict products liability. Id. at l()C). 
1 88 See note 147 supra. 
187 397 Mich. at 426, 244 N.W. 2d at 886. 
188 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 898 (4th ed. 1968): "The doctrine is that a person may be 
precluded by his act or conduct or silence, when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right 
which he otherwise would have had." 
WINTER 1979] Developments in Successor Liability 377 
reliance on the representations of continuity made by the trans-
feree. Thus, they should not be able to argue that the transferee be 
es topped. Even if the doctrine could be said to apply to a succes-
sor's representations of continuity with its predecessor, in a more 
general sense the Michigan court's reliance upon the principle ap-
pears to be superfluous since the policy considerations adopted by 
the court amply support the imposition of successor liability with-
out any proof of specific representations on the part of the succes-
sor entity or specific reliance thereon by the injured plaintiff .189 
Those policies presume that the public expectations of product 
suitability and safety arise from the simple fact that the product is 
offered in the marketplace. 190 At least arguably, then, the Michi-
gan court's reliance on the principle of estoppel as a basis for im-
posing products liability on a transferee of assets is not only tech-
nically suspect, but unnecessary given the policy considerations 
espoused by the court. 
3. Manufacturer Fault - A more plausible explanation for the 
Turner court's adoption of a test of successor responsibility based 
on enterprise continuity rather than product line continuity may be 
that considerations of enterprise continuity are more consistent 
with the concept of products liability adopted by the Michigan Su-
preme Court. Although the court has approved the economic pol.: 
icy justifications of risk spreading and efficient cost allocation un-
derpinning the doctrine of strict products liability, it has refused to 
adopt the doctrine as a separate theory ofrecovery. 191 Instead, an 
injured plaintiff may seek recompense from a manufacturer or sel-
ler in Michigan under the theories of negligence or breach of an im-
plied warrant of fitness. This strongly suggests that the Michigan 
court is, as yet, unwilling to impose liability without some showing 
of fault on the part of the party held responsible. 
One Michigan court has asserted that in practice this gap in 
Michigan's products liability law has little impact because the 
proof problems presented by a claim of breach of implied warranty 
of fitness are similar to those presented by a claim of strict prod-
ucts liability. 192 Since the warranty is implied by law, it arises in-
dependently of any contractual representation, privity need not be 
shown, and the plaintiff's rights are not affected by contractual dis-
189 See text accompanying note 105 supra. 
190 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,377 P.2d 'i!87, 27 Cal. Rptr. 
697 (1963). 
191 In Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 74 Mich. App. 532,254 N.W. 2d 569 (1977), the court 
noted that "[i]n Michigan, two theories of recovery are recognized in product liability cases: 
negligence and implied warranty. Strict liability has not been recognized as a third theory of 
recovery." Id. at 532, 254 N.W. 2d at 571. 
102 Id. 
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claimers or the failure to give timely notice. 1 93 In fact, the Michi-
gan court has defined the elements of the cause of action in terms 
essentially equivalent to the most commonly espoused definition of 
strict products liability. 194 Although it may be true that the two 
theories operate similarly in some contexts, it does not follow that 
they are functionally equivalent, for they are conceptually distinct. 
The Michigan court has, itself, acknowledged the major distinction 
between the two doctrines: it has emphatically declared that the 
liability imposed as a result of a breach of the implied warranty is 
not liability without fault. 195 The plaintiff's_ right to recompense 
arises as a result of a tortious wrong on the part of the manufac-
turer in that the product was marketed in a defective condition. 1 96 
In contrast, under the doctrine of strict products liability the manu-
facturer's responsibility arises whenever that is the most efficient 
allocation of the loss .197 
By conditioning the injured plaintiffs right to recover on a find-
ing that the manufacturer committed a tortious wrong, rather than 
on a determination that the manufacturer provides the most effi-
cient economic allocation of the cost of the injury, the Michigan 
court focuses the inquiry on the behavior of the manufacturer. In 
this framework, successor responsibility for the tortious wrongs of 
its predecessor could not logically be justified by a finding of prod-
uct line continuity alone. The question of successor responsibility 
should turn instead on a finding of substantial identity between the 
193 In Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W. 2d 129 (1965), the 
Michigan Supreme Court adopted a common-law remedy for the tortious breach of a legally 
implied, rather than contractually created, warranty of fitness. 
In its inception, the action for breach of warranty sounded in tort. The breach was of an 
assumed duty and the wrong was characterized as a misrepresentation. Only more recently 
were warranties characterized as express or implied terms of a sales contract and the cause 
of action as a breach of contract. Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. I, 8 (1888). 
In Michigan, the ancient common law tort warranty has been preserved as the functional 
equivalent of the theory of strict products liability. The term "strict liability" was not 
adopted because the court believed it might be confused with the classic concept ofabsolute 
liability. Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 612-14, 182 N.W. 2d 800, 
805-07 (1970); see note 2 supra. For a general discussion of the historic roots of warranty, 
see Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117 (1943). 
194 In Piercefield, the court defined the concept of implied warranty in these terms: 
Implied warranty recovery is based upon two factors: (a) the product or article in 
question has been transferred from the manufacturer's possession while in a 'defec-
tive' state, more specifically, the product fails either to be 'reasonably fit for the 
particular purpose intended' orof 'merchantable quality,' as these two terms, sepa-
rate but often overlapping, are defined by the law; and (b) as a result of being 'de-
fective,' the product causes personal injury or property damages. 
375 Mich. at 96-97, 133 N .W. 2d at 134. This statement by the court of the elements of im-
plied. warranty recovery is almost identical to the opening lines of the definition of strict 
products liability embodied in Restatement § 402A. See note 97 supra. 
195 Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. at 98, 133 N.W. 2d at 135. 
196 Id. at 95, 133 N.W. 2d at 133. 
197 See text accompanying notes 107-12 supra. 
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transferor and transferee. Clearly the nature of the injured plain-
tiff's cause of action in Michigan provides one rational explanation 
for the adoption of a test of successor responsibility premised on 
enterprise continuity. At least one federal court 198 has reached the 
same conclusion. It recently characterized successor responsibility 
under the Michigan rule as "classic vicarious liability. " 199 
Vicarious liability is an ancient doctrine under which an innocent 
person may be held responsible for the tortious wrongs of another 
due to the nature of the relationship which exists between the 
two.200 Liability for the injury flowing from the wrong is imposed 
on the innocent party because the original wrongdoer is unavail-
able or insolvent, and the innocent party has voluntarily assumed a 
relationship with the wrongdoer such that it is just and equitable to 
hold him accountable. 201 A number of rationales have been pro-
posed as justifying the impositions of responsibility on one for the 
acts of another. Early writers spoke of the master's control over 
the servant, the superior knowledge of the master compared to the 
injured plaintiff, the possibility that liability might encourage the 
master to supervise his servants more carefully, and finally, the no-
tion that the master benefited from the risk-producing activities of 
his servants and therefore his "deep pocket" should absorb the 
losses generated by their activities. 202 Today, these justifications 
have synthesized into a general statement of social policy remark-
ably similar to the policies underpinning strict products liability. 203 
Despite this similarity in rationale, vicarious liability differs from 
strict products liability because it is premised on a tortious wrong 
198 Trimper v. Bruno-Sherman Corp., 436 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
199 Id. at 351. 
20° For a general discussion of the origin and development of the doctrine of vicarious 
liability see W. PRossER, supra note 8, Ch. 12; James, Vicarious Liability, 28 TuL. L. REv. 
161 (1954). 
201 The principle of vicarious liability, sometimes known as respondeat superior, may 
have originated in the context of master and servant, but has gradually been extended to a 
wide variety of situations where the one to be held responsible stands in some close relation-
ship to the one at fault. W. PRossER, supra note 8, at 552-53. 
202 Each of these rationales for imposing vicarious liability is discussed in James, supra 
note 200, at 165-71. 
203 This development is summarized by Dean Prosser: 
What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of pol-
icy, a deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of an employe-
es, which as a practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer's 
enterprise are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing busi-
ness. They are placed upon the employer because, having engaged in an enterprise 
which will, on the basis of all past experience, involve harm to others ... , and 
sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, 
should bear them; and because he is better able to absorb them, and to distribute 
them, through prices, rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them 
to society, to the community at large. 
W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 459 [footnotes omitted]. 
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committed by someone. It cannot arise without proof of a negligent 
act. 204 Thus, even though the one charged is himself without fault, 
the doctrine is not a novel system of liability: it merely provides a 
broader class of parties who may properly be held responsible for a 
tortious wrong. 205 
Given the nature of the causes of action available in Michigan for 
product-related injuries, it is reasonable to conclude that the dis-
trict court's characterization of the rule of successor liability is cor-
rect.206 In this context, the Michigan court's preference for a test 
of transferee liability based on substantial continuity of identity be-
tween the transferor and transferee is justifiable. The court could 
have held that continuity of product line alone would provide a suf-
ficient nexus between the transferor and transferee to justify the 
imposition of liability on the transferee. But the element of indi-
vidual responsibility, which is essential to a finding of wrongful 
conduct, strongly suggests that a broader test premised on the 
identification between the transferor and transferee would be more 
consistent with the underlying legal doctrine justifying the imposi-
tion of liability on the original manufacturer. 
4. Application of the Michigan Test-Although a rationale for 
the nature of the Michigan test of successor responsibility is 
suggested by the causes of action available in the state for 
product-related claims, it is difficult to understand the court's de-
liberate adoption of the test of enterprise continuity in light of the 
practical problems of administration which such a test could 
create. In particular, difficulty may arise in cases where the prod-
uct which caused the injury is no longer produced, and in cases 
where the enterprise identity has been purchased by one entity and 
the means of producing a particular product line by another. 207 
Two recent decisions in the Sixth Circuit208 are illustrative of the 
latter problem. 
Both these cases involved an injury to the plaintiff, Trimper, on a 
Sheridan die cutting press manufactured before 1964. In 1964, 
Sheridan sold all its assets to Harris Intertype for adequate cash 
consideration and dissolved. 209 Harris continued to manufacture 
and market Sheridan's lines of presses as the Sheridan Division of 
20
• Id. at 552-53. 
20• Id. 
20
• See text accompanying notes 198-99 supra. But see Note, Postdissolution Product 
Claims and the Emerging Rule of Product Liability, 64 VA. L. REV. 861, 875 (1978), where 
the author comments that the Trimper court's characterization of the Turner test is "novel" 
since the plaintiffs asserted claims of strict liability. 
207 See text accompanying notes 180-83 supra for a discussion of these potential situations 
and the effect of the Michigan test. 
208 Trimper v. Harris Corp., 441 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Trimper v. Bruno-
Sherman Corp., 436 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
20
• See text accompanying notes l(J()-61 supra for another description of this corporate 
acquisition. 
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Harris Intertype. In 1970, Harris sold the assets associated with the 
type of Sheridan press which later injured Trimper to Bruno-
Sherman for adequate cash consideration. The sale included 
goodwill, historical data, patents, trademarks, and equipment as-
sociated with the die cutting press and provided that for a period of 
five years the presses manufactured by Bruno-Sherman could be 
marketed as the "Sheridan Die Cutting Press manufactured by 
Bruno-Sherman Corporation. " 210 The Sheridan Division of Harris 
Intertype continued to market other types of Sheridan presses. 
Thus, when Trimper was injured in 1973, there were two viable 
corporate entities representing themselves to the public as the con-
tinuation of the original manufacturer. Accordingly, Trimper 
sought recompense from both Harris and Bruno-Sherman in sepa-
rate actions.211 
In the case of Trimper v. Bruno-Sherman Corp., 21 2 the federal 
district court examined the nature of the sale of assets to Bruno-
Sherman and concluded that the "totality of the transaction ... 
[demonstrated] a basic continuity of the die cutting press enter-
prise. " 213 Therefore, the court held that the principle of estoppel 
which led the Michigan Supreme Court in Turner to impose vicari-
ous liability on Harris supported the imposition of vicarious liabil-
ity on Bruno-Sherman. However, this result is not truly consistent 
with the thrust of the Turner test. Bruno-Sherman actually pur-
chased only one of several product lines associated with the Sheri-
dan name. The Sheridan Division of Harris Intertype continued to 
possess all the elements of enterprise continuity stressed by the 
Michigan court in Turner 214 after the sale of assets to Bruno-
Sherman, except those elements directly related to the specific 
product which was the object of the transfer. The fact that Bruno-
Sherman acquired the right to use the Sheridan name for only a few 
years after the purchase is compelling evidence that the Sheridan 
Division fully intended to maintain its public status as the succes-
sor to the original manufacturer despite the sale of selected assets 
to Bruno-Sherman.215 Yet, the imposition of liability on Bruno-
Sherman is fully compatible with the economic policy considera-
210 436 F. Supp. at 350. 
211 Trimper v. Harris Corp., 441 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Trimper v. Bruno-
Sherman Corp., 436 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
212 436 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
2 13 Id. at 350. 
21
• 397 Mich. at 430, 244 N.W. 2d at 883-84. 
2 15 436 F. Supp. at 350. The federal district court noted that: 
Id. 
[t]he contract of sale also included a ten-year non-competition clause; provided for 
training of the buyer's employees and for providing technical assistance; and an-
ticipated that for a period of up to five (5) years presses manufac.tured by the buyer 
could contain the following name: Sheridan Die Cutting Press Manufactured by 
Bruno-Sherman Corporation. 
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tions relied upon in Turner. The entity that markets the product is 
obviously in the best position to assess and provide for the risk of 
injuries resulting from the use of that product. Clearly, the result 
reached by the district court is expressive of the policy considera-
tions underpinning Turner 216 even though it is not consistent with 
the literal requirements of the Turner test.217 
The full significance of the difficulties created by Turner be-
comes evident in the companion opinion. In Trimper v. Harris 
Corp. ,218 the same federal district court concluded that the policies 
espoused in Turner required that both Harris and Bruno-Sherman 
be held vicariously liable for Trim per' s injuries. 2 19 The court based 
its determination on the fact that, by the terms of the sale, Harris 
"made it possible for Bruno-Sherman Corporation to continue the 
illusion of continuity between the original manufacturer and 
Bruno-Sherman Corporation." 220 While the district court's reason-
ing appears to bear little relationship to the concerns voiced in 
Turner, it is clear that the imposition of liability on Harris satisfied 
the technical letter of the Turner test for finding successor respon-
sibility. The Sheridan Division of Harris retained all the elements 
of enterprise continuity emphasized by the Michigan court in 
Turner. But at the time of Trimper's accident, Harris no longer 
controlled the manufacture of the product that caused Trimper's in-
jury. Consequently, it could not lessen the chance of future injuries 
through improved product safety, or spread the cost of injury effi-
ciently among users of the product through adjustments in its mar-
ket price. 
The Trimper opinions graphically illustrate the contradiction in-
herent in the Turner opinion. Bruno-Sherman should bear the loss 
logically since it controls production of the product that caused the 
injury. But Bruno-Sherman does not manifest the outward charac-
teristics of enterprise continuity crucial to a finding of continuation 
under the Turner test. The Sheridan Division of Harris is clearly 
the successor to the enterprise identity of the original manufac-
turer, but it makes poor economic sense to impose the loss on an 
entity which did not produce the allegedly defective machine and 
which does not now control the production of that type of machine. 
On the authority of Turner, the district court could reasonably con-
clude that either successor to the original manufacturer was an ap-
21
• 397 Mich. at 425, 244 N.W. 2d at 881. 
217 Bruno-Sherman did not manifest the various indices of enterprise continuity which 
comprise the first and most significant factor in the Michigan test. Id. at 429,244 N.W. 2d at 
883. See note 171 supra. 
218 441 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
21
• Id. at 348. 
220 Id. 
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propriate entity to bear the loss. 
But it is less certain that Turner supports the Trimper court's 
finding of joint and several liability. One possible explanation for 
this aspect of the Trimper opinions may be the Michigan court's 
emphasis on the principle of estoppel in the formulation of the 
Turner test. Perhaps the federal district court was compelled by 
that part of the Turner analysis to conclude that if two or more 
transferees of a manufacturer's assets concurrently represent 
themselves to the public as continuations of that manufacturer, 
they must be held jointly and severally liable for injuries arising 
from previously marketed products of that manufacturer.221 Al-
though the result may therefore be in keeping with the concept of 
estoppel relied upon in Turner, arguably the imposition of joint and 
several liability is inconsistent with the economic policy considera-
tions voiced by the Michigan court. Efficient cost allocation is best 
achieved by the imposition of liability on only one entity: 222 the 
current distributor of the product that caused the injury. If the cost 
of injury is divided among two or more transferees of the original 
manufacturer's assets simply because they have represented or are 
representing themselves as the continuation of that enterprise, the 
current producer of the product line will be unable to pass the cost 
on to consumers of that product through its market price. An accu-
rate assessment of the cost of that product to society will therefore 
be impossible. 223 Moreover, the principle of vicarious liability does 
not compel a finding of joint and several liability. The concept of 
vicarious liability merely expresses a value judgement that, as be-
tween two innocent parties, the injured plaintiff and the one held 
vicariously liable, the loss generated by a wrongful act should not 
be borne by the injured plaintiff, but by the party that has voluntar-
ily placed itself in a close relationship to the wrongdoer. 224 Logi-
cally, only one such substitute for the initial wrongdoer need be lo-
cated to provide recompense to the injured plaintiff. Therefore, 
were it not for the reliance on the principle of estoppel in Turner, 
221 Id. The district court reasoned as follows: 
[u]nder the circumstances, it is consistent with the public policy of the State of 
Michigan defined in Turner to hold both Harris Corporation and Bruno-Sherman 
Corporation vicariously liable to the injured party. It is not the injured party's con-
cern as to how that liability, if he wins his suit, will be allocated or borne as be-
tween them. 
Id. Clearly, the court contemplates only one satisfaction for the plaintiff rather than single or 
multiple judgments, so the liability may be fairly characterized asjoint and several. 
222 Logically, too, efficiency is better served by the institution of one legal action to ob-
tain relief rather than multiple suits. This simple notion of judicial economy was one of the 
original rationales espoused in favor of the adoption of strict products liability. Escola v. 
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d at 463, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J. concurring). 
223 See note 110 supra. 
224 See text accompanying notes 200-05 supra. 
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the federal court could have concluded that the policies expressed 
in Turner would be satisfied by the imposition of liability on 
Bruno-Sherman alone. 
It is also possible that the federal court was persuaded on equita-
ble grounds to hold Harris and Bruno-Sherman jointly and sever-
ally liable for Trimper's injuries. If either were forced to bear the 
loss alone, the other would benefit from a "windfall" profit, since 
the purchase price of the assets probably did not reflect the cost of 
contingent products liability claims.225 The argument that the im-
position of successor responsibility by the judiciary involves unfair 
surprise for the parties to transfers completed years before and 
"windfall" profits for the entity escaping responsibility have 
strong appeal, but the Michigan Supreme Court rejected them in 
Turner. 226 It is unlikely, therefore, that these equitable concerns 
alone influenced the federal district court to impose joint and sev-
eral liability on Harris and Bruno-Sherman. 
The Trimper court's interpretation of Turner may have serious 
detrimental effects on future sales of businesses as going concerns. 
The valuation problems created by the Turner court's focus on en-
terprise continuity are significant in themselves because a succes-
sor to the identity of an ongoing business must be prepared to as-
sume responsibility for accidents involving every product ever 
produced by its predecessor. The Trimper interpretations of Turner 
create additional uncertainties. In holding Bruno-Sherman respon-
sible for Trimper's loss, the district court ruled that continuity of 
product line was sufficient evidence of continuation to satisfy the 
Turner test. The language of Turner suggests, however, that the 
Michigan court would not have imposed responsibility based on 
this fact alone. In holding Harris equally responsible, Trimper im-
plies that responsibility for product-related injuries may not be 
terminated, even by divestiture. These two aspects of the Trimper 
opinions make it much more difficult for the parties contemplating 
the purchase of an ongoing enterprise to predict the extent of their 
potential future liability. They may contract among themselves as 
to which party will bear the costs of future liabilities, but the in-
jured plaintiff may, under the authority of Trimper, pursue any one 
or all of the present and former owners of the assets. Thus, it is 
impossible to predict which entity will be forced to initially bear the 
burden of litigation. 
The degree of uncertainty created by the Turner and Trimper 
22
• See note 79 supra. 
226 397 Mich. at 428, 244 N. W. 2d at 883. The Michigan Court quoted from Cyr, 501 F. 2d 
at 1154: "While the first such successor to be faced with such a liability may claim surprise, 
the claim lacks legal force. For this kind of surprise is endemic in a system where legal prin-
ciples are applied case by case .... " 
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opinions suggests that the Turner formulation for imposing succes-
sor responsibility does not represent a workable balance between 
the needs of injured plaintiffs and those of the business community. 
Certainly the interest of the injured person in recompense would be 
served as effectively by a rule of successor responsibility that des-
ignated one viable defendant as by a rule that allows the pursuit of 
multiple defendants. The compelling need of the business commun-
ity for predictability can only be served by a. rule that selects one 
''best'' entity to bear the responsibility for product-related 
liabilities. 
The rationale underlying the Turner test of successor responsibil-
ity may also have an unanticipated effect in cases where the injured 
person is a worker and his employer has negligently maintained or 
removed safety equipment from the machine that caused the in-
jury. Typically, such injuries are compensated by the employer 
under the worker's compensation law. The amount of liability is 
determined in an administrative proceeding and the award is in-
tended to be the exclusive remedy available to an employee against 
his employer.227 He may, however, seek additional recompense 
from third parties.228 Where there is evidence that the employer's 
negligence played a role in the employee's injury, third parties sued 
by the employee have sought to join the employer on the theories 
of contribution or indemnity. 229 
In Husted v. Consumers Power Co., 230 the Michigan Supreme 
Court considered the viability of such a claim for contribution 
given the clear intent of the legislature that an employer who pays 
compensation under the worker's compensation law should not be 
subjected "to any other liability whatsoever. " 231 The court 
adopted the reasoning of the majority of jurisdictions that a third 
party cannot seek contribution from an employer whose concur-
ring negligence contributed to the employee's injury because the 
employer is notjointly liable to the employee in tort: his liability is 
an absolute liability imposed by statute. 232 The court reserved the 
question of a third party's right against an employer for indemnity. 
In Dale v. Whiteman 233 the court considered whether the exclusive 
227 See note 9 supra. 
22s Id. 
229 Contribution is defined as the "[r]ight of one who has discharged a common liability to 
recover of another also liable, the aliquot portion which he ought to pay or bear." BLACK'S 
LAW D1cr10NARY 399 (4th ed. 1968). Indemnity is an equitable right.to restitution. It arises, 
for example, in favor of a person who is held liable for damages without any personal fault 
on his part for the tortious act of another. 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 21 (1944). 
230 376 Mich. 41, 135 N.W. 2d 370 (1965). 
231 Id. at 53, 135 N.W. 2d at 375. 
232 Id. at 54-55, 135 N.W. 2d at 376. 
233 388 Mich. 698, 202 N.W. 2d 797 (1972). 
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remedy provision is also a bar to that claim. It concluded that it 
was not because the exclusive remedy provision was intended to 
block only those actions against an employer by its employee or 
one which is derivative from his claim.234 In Dale the plaintiff was 
an employee at a carwash. He was drying an automobile on the 
carwash apron when he was struck by Whiteman's car as it was 
driven from the washline by a fellow employee. Under the car 
owner's liability statute2"35 Whiteman was liable to the plaintiff 
though he was without fault. He therefore filed a third-party com-
plaint against Dale's employer for indemnifica~ion. The Michigan 
Su pre me Court held that Whiteman' s right to indemnification arose 
independently of the claim of the employee against his employer 
and that therefore it was not barred by the exclusive remedy provi-
sion.236 
If the Trimper court was correct in characterizing the Turner test 
for successor liability as "classic vicarious liability," 237 then it 
would seem that the principle adopted in Dale would be applicable 
to successor entities charged with responsibility for product-
related injuries in work settings. Since a large percentage of the 
products liability claims currently filed arise from work-related ac-
cidents ,238 the Dale holding could have a profound, unexpected 
impact on the practical operation of the Turner rule of successor 
liability. In situations where the employer has modified a machine 
or neglected to maintain it properly, the burden of loss may fall on 
the employer rather than the manufacturing entity's successor. 
It might be argued that this result is desirable. If the employer's 
acts contributed to the injury then it should bear the loss. The 
Michigan Supreme Court approved this policy in Dale, holding that 
the "[l]iability should fall upon the party best situated to adopt 
preventative measures. " 239 This is arguably contrary, however, to 
the clear intent of the legislature that the statutory remedy be the 
sole liability of an employer for its employees' injuries. 240 
234 Id. 708, 202 N .W. 2d at 802. 
235 M.C.L. § 257.401 (1970). 
236 388 Mich. at 708, 202 N. W. 2d at 802. The court noted that it was following the reason-
ing of the great majority of jurisdictions that had interpreted the meaning of their worker's 
compensation statutes on this particular question. Id. at 706, 202 N.W. 2d at 801. The court 
justified Whiteman's right to indemnity on the principle that "[l]iability should fall upon the 
party best situated to adopt preventative measures and thereby to reduce the likelihood of 
injury." Id. at 706, 202 N.W. 2d at 801, quoting Italia Societa per Azionidi Navigazione v. 
Oregon Stevedoring Co. Inc., 376 U.S. 315, 324 (1964). 
237 See note 199 supra. 
238 See note 9 supra. 
239 388 Mich. at 706, 202 N.W. 2d at 801. See note 236 supra. 
2
•
0 In Husted the Michigan Supreme Court noted that "the primordial intent of [the legis-
lature] was that quo to be received by the employer in return for his quid would be outright 
and absolute immunity from liability (except as provided in the act) stemming from each 
compensable injury." 376 Mich. at 53, 135 N.W. 2d at 375. 
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Moreover, it seems illogical to allow a successor to raise the de-
fense of the employer's negligence while the original manufacturer 
may not. 241 If public policy favors penalizing the employer for his 
negligence in a suit involving a successor to the original manufac-
turer of the machine, it should also favor penalizing the employer 
in suits involving the original manufacturer. 
It is apparent that the Michigan test for successor liability pro-
vides only a marginally acceptable balance between the interests of 
the injured plain tiff and the business community. The test may also 
be difficult for courts to apply consistently in novel factual settings 
because the Turner court premised the imposition of successor re-
sponsibility on the principle of vicarious liability. Finally, the test 
may have unexpected and undesirable effects on the operation of 
Michigan's worker's compensation law. 
B. The California Test 
Within six months of the Turner opinion, the Supreme Court of 
California also devised a special rule for determining transferee lia-
bility for product-related injuries. In Ray v. Alad Corporation, 242 
the plaintiff/appellant was injured falling from a ladder manufac-
turer by Alad Corporation (Alad I). About one year prior to this 
accident, Alad I sold all its assets to Lighting Maintenance Co. for 
adequate cash consideration. Alad I subsequently dissolved and 
Lighting Maintenance transferred the Alad I assets to a newly-
formed entity, Alad Corporation (Alad II). Ray brought his prod-
ucts liability claim against Alad II. Relying on the general rule of 
nonassumption, the trial court granted Alad 's motion for summary 
judgment because the transfer was for adequate cash consideration 
and there was no continuity of ownership between Alad I and Alad 
II. At the intermediate appellate level, 243 the California Court of 
Appeals asserted that Alad H's responsibility to Ray should be de-
termined by reference to the principles of strict products liability 
described in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, /nc. 244 rather 
than by reference to the contractual arrangement between Alad I 
and Alad II .245 Stressing the physical similarities between Alad I 
and Alad II, the appellate court adopted as its ruling the conclusion 
241 The original manufacturer may not join the employer as a joint tortfeasor. See text 
accompanying notes 230-32 supra. 
242 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). 
243 Ray v. Alad Corp., 127 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Ct. App. 1976). 
244 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700-01 (1963). See note 104 
supra. 
245 Ray v. Alad Corp., 127 Cal. Rptr. at 820. 
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of the dissent in Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 246 that strict products 
liability adheres to a business so long as it "retains its distinctive 
identity and character and continues to be operated as it has in the 
past. "247 
On final appeal, the California Supreme Court vacated the opin-
ion below. 248 Observing that the existing corporate principles gov-
erning successor liability were not designed to address the special 
problems presented by a products liability claim, the court con-
cluded that a new exception to the general rule of nonassumption 
was required. 249 The court reviewed the policy considerations 
which justify the imposition of strict products liability on the origi-
nal manufacturer and determined that those policies would also 
justify imposing strict products liability on a successor to the origi-
nal manufacturer where: (1) the successor acquires the ongoing 
business operation and continues to market the original manufac-
turer's product line; (2) the successor benefits from the goodwill 
associated with the ongoing manufacturing concern, a benefit that 
the original manufacturer could not have enjoyed without also 
bearing the burdens of potential products liability; and (3) the in-
jured plaintiff has no viable remedy against the original manufac-
turer of the defective product. 250 Thus, under the California rule, a 
transferee of assets must assume primary responsibility for 
product-related claims arising from goods marketed by its pre-
decessor where the transferee continues the business operation 
and continues to market the product that caus~d the injury. 
I. Product Line Continuity-This special rule of transferee con-
tinuity for products liability claims is more consistent with the pol-
icy considerations of strict products liability than is a rule premised 
on enterprise continuity alone. Presumably, the court in Ray meant 
246 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 850, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 560 (1975) (Fleming, J., dissenting). 
247 Ray v. Alad Corp., 127 Cal. Rptr. at 822, quoting from Ortiz, 46 Cal. App. 3d at 851, 
120 Cal. Rptr. at 561 (Fleming, J., dissenting). The Ortiz opinion is discussed more fully in 
the text accompanying notes 155-58 supra. 
248 Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). 
249 The court reviewed the various options available to a products liability plaintiff whose 
cause of action arises after the dissolution of the original manufacturer and concluded that 
the operation of the existing rules governing successor liability would work a particular 
hardship on the injured person as compared to the other types of claimants. Ray v. Alad 
Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 31-33, 560 P.2d at 9-11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580-82. 
250 The court reasoned that: 
[j]ustifications for imposing strict liability upon a successor to a manufacturer 
under the circumstances here presented rests upon (I) the virtual destruction of the 
plaintiff's remedies against the original manufacturer caused by the successor's ac-
quisition of the business, (2) the successor's ability to assume the original manufac-
turer's risk-spreading role, and (3) the fairness of requiring the successor to assume 
a responsibility for defective products that was a burden necessarily attached to the 
original manufacturer's good will being enjoyed by the successor in the continued 
operation of the business. 
Id. at 31, 560 P.2d at 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80. 
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to impose liability on a successor to the original manufacturer only 
if the successor continues to market the product that caused the 
injury. If, at the time of acquisition, the transferee chooses to dis-
continue production of a particular product, the California test 
should prevent the transferee from assuming responsibility for in-
juries caused by previously marketed units of that line. Admit-
tedly, this aspect of the rule's operation will block access to the 
most desirable defendant for persons injured by a discontinued 
product after that product's original manufacturer has dissolved. 
But even this effect is essentially consistent with the policies un-
derlying strict products liability. Since the transferee derives little 
or no benefit from a discontinued product, it should not be forced 
to bear losses associated with that product. Moreover, the policy 
favoring improved public safety anticipates that marginally unsafe 
product designs will gradually disappear from the marketplace. 251 
The product line element of the California test should also pre-
vent the imposition of liability on a successor for injuries arising 
from products discontinued by its predecessor before the transfer 
of control. This, too, will clearly limit the number of viable defen-
dants available to persons injured by those products, but it is 
otherwise consistent with the underlying policy considerations 
enumerated by the California Court. 252 
Thus, the product line element of the California test for succes-
sor liability recognizes the need of the business community to con-
trol the effects of commercial transactions and predict future costs. 
Since the risk of contingent products liability is assumed only upon 
the decision to continue production of the particular product, a po-
tential purchaser of an ongoing business operation can more easily 
estimate the value of, and control the transfer of, the assets as-
sociated with each product acquired. Therefore, the rule enun-
ciated in Ray effectively balances the interests of products liability 
claimants, the policies of efficient cost allocation, risk spreading, 
and improved product safety, and the acknowledged interests of 
business in predictability and control of future costs. 
2. Enterprise Continuity-Although product line continuity is 
clearly an essential element in the California test of successor con-
tinuity, it is not the only factor enumerated by the court. In Ray, 
the court made repeated references to numerous elements of en-
251 See text accompanying notes 107-12 supra. Even though the purchaser of assets may 
avoid future products liability by discontinuing the product after acquisition, the California 
rule does not preclude an injured plaintiff's pursuit of another members in the chain of dis-
tribution. Arguably, this effect of the California rule is contrary to the widely accepted no-
tion that members of the distributive chain are merely conduits and their losses from prod-
ucts liability suits should be passed on to the manufacturer. See note 9 supra. 
252 But see note 251 supra. 
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terprise continuity between Alad I and Alad 11253 and concluded 
that the imposition on Alad II of responsibility for injuries arising 
from products sold by Alad I was "fair and equitable " 254 because 
Alad II held itself out to potential customers as the same enter-
prise. Thus, it seems evident that enterprise continuity is an im-
plied, if not express, element in the California rule. It is not clear 
from Ray, however, what elements of enterprise continuity other 
than continued production of a product line would provide a level 
of business continuity sufficient to justify the imposition of liability 
on a transferee. The circumstances presented in Ray surely com-
prise the most obvious case of enterprise arid product line con-
tinuity, for Alad II apparently acquired and exploited every possi-
ble aspect of Alad I's corporate and product line identity. 255 There-
fore, the Ray opinion is more narrowly drawn than would appear 
from a reading of the rule of transferee liability adopted by the 
court. It remains to be seen whether the California Court will insist 
upon proof of enterprise continuity in future cases, or place in-
creasing emphasis on the one factor which is central to an imposi-
tion of liability premised on the policy justifications of strict prod-
ucts liability: product line continuity. 
3. Viability of The Original Manufacturer-One other aspect of 
the California rule could prove to be a source of confusion for busi-
ness planners in the future. Under the rule as framed by Ray, so 
long as the original manufacturer remains a viable legal entity it will 
continue to be primarily responsible for product liability claims 
arising from products it marketed, even though the ongoing busi-
253 For example, the court described the transfer of control as follows: 
The tangible assets acquired by Lighting included Alad I's manufacturing plant, 
machinery, offices, office fixtures and equipment, and inventory of raw materials, 
semi-finished goods. These assets were used to continue the manufacturing opera-
tions without interruption except for the closing of the plant for about a week "for 
inventory." The factory personnel remained the same, and identical "extrusion 
plans" were used for producing the aluminum components of the ladders. The em-
ployee of Lighting designated as the enterprise's general manager as well as the 
other previous employes of Lighting were all without experience ·in the manufac-
ture of ladders. The former general manager of Alad I, Mr. Hambly, remained with 
the business as a paid consultant for about six months after the takeover. 
The "Alad" name was used for all ladders produced after the change of man-
agement. Besides the name, Lighting and A lad II acquired Alad I's lists of custom-
ers, whom they solicited, and continued to employ the salesman and manufac-
turer's representatives who had sold ladders for Alad I. Aside from a redesign of 
the logo, or corporate emblem, on the letterheads and labels, there was no indica-
tion on any of the printed materials to indicate that a new company was manufac-
turing A lad ladders, and the manufacturer's representatives were not instructed to 
notify customers of the change. 
Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 27-28, 560 P.2d at 6-7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577-78. 
254 Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581. 
255 See note 253 supra. 
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ness and product line have since been sold to a transferee. 256 If, at 
some point, the transferor is no longer a viable defendant because 
of dissolution or distribution of its assets, primary responsibility 
for subsequent product liability claims automatically shifts to the 
transferee marketing the product line at that time. Of course, the 
rule does not prevent the parties to the transfer from negotiating on 
the issue of financial responsibility for such contingent claims; it 
only determines primary legal responsibility to the injured plaintiff. 
To the extent that this rule separates ongoing legal and financial 
responsibility for product-related injuries from the entity that con-
trols the manufacture of the product, it may not be the most effec-
tive way to stimulate continued improvement of product safety. It 
is almost certain, however, that the cost of such injuries will be ac-
curately reflected in the product's market price regardless of which 
corporate entity bears primary legal responsibility for contingent 
products liability. Once the parties to a transfer realize that such 
contingent claims will no longer be barred by the operation of the 
rule of nonassumption, the valuation of a transferor's assets will 
surely reflect the contractual agreement between the parties as to 
which entity will bear final financial responsibility for such claims, 
and their estimated total cost. Thus, the economic rationale rep-
resented by the policies of superior risk-spreading ability and accu-
rate cost allocation are adequately expressed whether primary 
legal responsibility is placed on the transferor or transferee. 
Even though the California rule places primary legal responsibil-
ity on the transferor as long as it continues to exist as a viable en-
tity, any sales agreement must take into account the possibility that 
the transferor could dissolve or become insolvent at some future 
point. The transferee would then become exposed to primary liabil-
ity for subsequent claims. Therefore, as a practical matter, a trans-
feree under this rule cannot be completely certain of freedom from 
future claims arising from the transferor's products, and the price 
paid for the ongoing enterprise will accordingly be discounted to 
reflect these considerations. Given the fact tha't the policies under-
lying the imposition of strict products liability are indifferent to the 
location of primary legal responsibility on either the transferor or 
transferee, the California court's inclusion of the element of trans-
feror unavailability in the test for transferee liability would seem to 
be unnecessary. 
It is possible that the inclusion of the requirement of transferor 
unavailability was motivated by considerations of individual re-
sponsibility. The court stated that the imposition of liability on a 
256 See text accompanying note 250 supra. 
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transferee is "fair and equitable;'257 where that transferee has as-
sumed the corporate identity of its transferor. This would seem to 
imply that when the transferor exists as a viable legal entity, it 
would not be "fair and equitable" to impose responsibility for in-
juries caused by its products on its successor. It is also possible 
that the court included the element of transferor unavailability in 
the rule because strict products liability has traditionally been im-
posed on members of the chain of distribution of the defective 
product. 258 While a transferee might continue to market the prod-
ucts of its predecessor, it may not be a member of the chain of dis-
tribution of the particular unit that caused the injury. Therefore, if 
the original manufacturer exists as a viable legal entity, the classic 
formulation of strict products liability theory would select that en-
tity as the logical party to bear primary responsibility. Since the 
economic policies of risk-spreading and efficient cost allocation are 
indifferent to the primary location of responsibility, the California 
court may have concluded that the element of transferor unavaila-
bility was essential to the symmetry of its developing scheme of 
strict products liability law. Whatever the court's motivation, re-
quiring that the transferor be unavailable before liability is imposed 
upon the transferee may prove to be a trap for the unwary purchas-
er, and will surely further complicate the already formidable task of 
accurate asset valuation. 
Although the California court was unwilling to frame its rule of 
transferee liability solely in terms of product line continuity, the 
rule adopted by the court in Ray represents a substantial step in the 
continuing evolution of the concepts of products liability law. 
However, to date no other state court has abrogated the traditional 
rule of nonassumption in favor of the Ray formulation. Moreover, 
on two occasions the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has ex-
pressly declined to adopt the California rule in anticipation of its 
adoption by the relevant state court. 259 
In Travis v. Harris Corp., 260 the Seventh Circuit was urged to 
adopt the California rule as the law of Indiana in a case where the 
plaintiff was injured by a die press manufactured by the predeces-
sor of Harris, T.W. & C.B. Sheridan Co.261 The court refused to 
anticipate such a sweeping change in the existing law of Indiana 
257 Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581. 
258 W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 664-65. 
259 Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977); Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 
F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977). 
260 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977). 
261 This suit is yet another in a series of claims brought against Harris Intertype and/or' 
Bruno-Sherman Corporation for injuries resulting from the use of Sheridan die cutting pres-
ses. The details of the changes in corporate form are explained in the text accompanying 
notes 160-61, 208-10 supra. 
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and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the claim against Harris 
and Bruno-Sherman. 262 Similarly, in Leannais v. Cincinnati-Forte 
Co., 263 the court was asked to adopt the California rule as the law 
of Wisconsin. The plaintiff was injured by a machine manufactured 
by Forte Equipment Co. Forte had previously sold its assets to 
Cincinnati-Forte for adequate cash consideration. The court noted 
that strict products liability had been adopted in Wisconsin,264 but 
refused to predict on that basis alone that the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court would adopt a test of transferee liability similar to the 
California rule. 265 Moreover, the court denounced the California 
rule as judicial usurpation of legislative powers and postulated that 
such sweeping changes in a major principle underlying the planning 
of commercial acquisitions should be left to the scrutiny of the 
legislature. 266 
C. The Role of Legislation 
Although the bulk of products liability law has evolved through 
judicial modification of existing legal doctrines to meet particular 
problems presented by the impact of increased industrialization on 
consumers,267 the reservations expressed by the Seventh Circuit 
concerning the wisdom of judicial activism in this particular aspect 
of products liability law are, arguably, well taken. Manifestly, each 
state has an interest in defining the rights and obligations of its citi-
zens and the corporations operating within its borders. It is true, 
however, that the traditional rules governing the rights and obliga-
262 Travis· v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d at 448. 
263 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977). 
264 Id. at 441, citing Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). 
265 The court observed that: 
[t]here is an essential difference between the fixing of responsibility upon manufac-
turers or sellers for their own acts and transferring that responsibility to a purchas-
ing corporation innocent of and having no control over those acts. The latter may 
be good policy or bad, but it is not the policy set forth in Dippel. 
Id. at 471 n.8. 
266 The court expressed doubt as to the ability of the judiciary to identify and balance all 
the interests affected by such a dramatic modification of the existing patterns: 
With deference, grave risks arise from court adoption of policy considerations to 
effect a change in a law so fundamental to the interdependent economic segments 
of a complex society. Whether the mounting costs of such change can be absorl>ed 
by insurance, whether product liability costs may grow so high in one state as to 
encourage business emigration, whether the relationship of workmen's compensa-
tion laws to product liability laws should be adjusted, and whether the many other 
economic and social effects of such an exception can be justified; are questions dif-
ficult to answer by analysis of the facts of a particular case and, it would appear, 
are more amenable to legislative investigation and determination. 
Id. at 440-41 n.7. 
267 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment b (1965). 
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tions of parties affected by the transfer of commercial property are 
essentially similar in every jurisdiction.268 Apparently, the courts 
and legislatures have recognized that long-range financial commit-
ment requires a measure of predictability and consistency that is 
unattainable if every state subscribes to its own formula for deter-
mining these issues. It is now evident that the existing practices 
concerning commercial acquisitions will be significantly affected 
by the evolving law favoring recovery for product-related injuries. 
Moreover, a number of complex problems concerning the escalat-
ing cost of products liability litigation, the unavailability of insur-
ance, the relationship of third party claims to the established pat-
tern of worker's compensation law, and proposals for comprehen-
sive social insurance cannot be adequately addressed by a court 
which has access only to the record made by the parties to the 
suit. 269 The legislature is a more appropriate body to gather the in-
formation necessary to strike a balance among these competing 
interests. Additionally, the legislature may control the retroactive 
effect of the rule it adopts. A judicially-framed exception to the 
general rule favoring the products liability plaintiff will surely sub-
ject many unsuspecting successor manufacturers to burdensome 
litigation and potentially crushing liability. The extent to which 
business viability should be prejudiced by the spectre of unantici-
pated products liability claims is a question of policy best deter-
mined by the legislative branch.270 The foregoing discussion of the 
analytic and practical problems presented by the Michigan and 
California tests suggests that the California formulation provides a 
more equitable balance between the interests of the injured plain tiff 
and the business community. Absent legislative action, the 
judiciary should acknowledge in its determinations the vital need of 
the business community for predictability and control by adopting 
a consistent test of successor responsibility for products liability 
claims in every jurisdiction. 
268 There are a few variations in the statutory rules governing corporate acquisitions. See 
text accompanying notes 42-58 supra. The judicially created exceptions to the general rule of 
nonassumption have been universally applied. See note 58 supra. 
269 See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. 
REv. 1281 (1976). 
270 The products liability problem has recently been the subject of an intensive Congres-
sional investigation. The scope and complexity of the problem attests to the need for an or-
ganized overview of the impact of products liability law on business, the economy, and the 
society in general as a preliminary step to any doctrinal modification. See U.S. FEDERAL 
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE INSURANCE 
STUDY (1977). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The respective obligations of the parties to a transfer of corpo-
rate assets have traditionally been determined by a group of well-
defined principles of corporate law. U oder these principles, the 
parties to the transfer may allocate or even eliminate responsibility 
for contingent liabilities associated with the assets through the 
mechanism of the transfer. By selecting a particular mode of trans-
fer, a manufacturer could effectively cut off future products liabil-
ity claims arising from the use of its predecessor's products. 
This body of corporate law has been the object of criticism in re-
cent years because its operation frustrates the compelling social 
policies underlying the principle of strict products liability. There-
fore, a number of courts have moved to modify the traditional cor-
porate rule, and two state courts recently abrogated the corporate 
formulation completely in claims involving product-related in-
juries, in favor of an entirely new standard for determining when a 
transferee of assets must bear the contingent products liability of 
the original manufacturer by operation of law. 
Both courts relied heavily on the economic rationales which 
stimulated the development of strict products liability for guidance 
in formulating the elements of continuity which would support the 
imposition of successor responsibility, but the tests adopted differ 
significantly. The Michigan test turns on a finding of substantial en-
terprise continuity. The California test emphasizes enterprise con-
tinuity but turns on the element of product line continuity. The 
existence of two distinct standards makes it more difficult for busi-
ness planners to predict the probable future products liability as-
sociated with the purchase of a going concern's assets. Thus, while 
both tests amply protect the interest of the injured plaintiff in re-
covery, they do not balance that interest against the business 
community's need for a measure of predictability, or the public 
interest in efficient risk-spreading, improved product safety, and 
incorporation of full social cos ts in pricing. 
The interests of the business community and the injured con-
sumer would be most effectively balanced by the statutory adop-
tion of one standard for determining transferee liability. That 
standard should be premised on the continuation of the production 
of the product line which allegedly caused the plaintiff's injury. By 
focusing on the product rather than the entity, the policy consider-
ations of strict products liability are well served, for the entity 
which controls the future development and distribution of the 
product should be forced to bear the cost of the injuries resulting 
from the continued use of that product. In addition, by hinging 
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transferee liability on the continued exploitation of the particular 
product line, the transferee may avoid future liability by making 
the economic decision to discontinue a product because its poten-
tial costs outweigh its anticipated revenue. 
Even though the bulk of products liability law has developed as a 
result of judicial willingness to modify existing legal principles, the 
complexity of the issues in this particular area, and the continuing 
economic interest in the free alienability of property, suggests that 
judicial activism in the development of the principles which control 
this question should be replaced by the careful deliberation of the 
legislature. 
- Mary Annette Horan 
